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INTRODUCTION 
Who is in the best position to know what a student should learn? 
It is with that single question that this entire dissertation 
is concerned. The excursions in it, which range from Zen Buddhism, 
to Philosophy of Science, to Cognitive Psychology, to the Physiology 
of the Eye, and beyond merely represent an attempt to approach the 
problem from a number of different perspectives. Thus, however far 
from the well-worn path of education this dissertation may travel, I 
would beg the reader to keep the single focus always in mind. For 
that focus remains continually in my mind as I write, and should it 
escape the notice of the reader that fact merely bespeaks the 
difficulty of communicating on paper all that needs to be communicated 
simultaneously. 
It would only be fair to say that it is not really the question 
which dominates all aspects of this treatise. Rather, it is a 
particular answer to the question which has guided my reading, which 
has dictated my selection of references and quotations, and which 
underlies the style and argumentation throughout. I believe that 
STUDENTS ARE ALWAYS THE BEST JUDGE OF WHAT THEY, INDIVIDUALLY, SHOULD' 
LEARN AT EVERY POINT IN THEIR LIVES. That is my bias, and it is a 
strong one which permeates all that is written here as a means of 
defending, explaining, and extrapolating that bias. 
- how they learn, As an educator, I am concerned with students 
what they learn, and what they need to learn. As a man, I am 
concerned with the more ultimate questions of what knowledge and 
existence are; of how men are able to answer and even ask such 
questions; of what it means to be a human being in a chaotic and, 
perhaps, meaningless world. But, unlike so many of the educators 
that I know and whose articles or books I have read, I cannot succeed 
in separating my professional from my human life. Nor do I want to. 
I teach, I write, I do "scholarly research", and I think about 
educational issues with the same mind and feelings and as the same 
person who hugs his wife tightly every night and sometimes refuses 
to eat her potato pancakes. 
This document is, thus, both a demonstration and an explanation 
_of_the unique unity-in-diversity of human perspectives. A demonstra¬ 
tion in the extent to which my particular biases color all that I 
write here. An explanation in the conventional sense of logical 
argumentation, citation of examples, and the building of models of 
the world. The logic of the argument is painfully simple, and should 
thus be schematized here so that the reader can see the remainder of 
this document as variations on a theme or embellishments on a simple 
picture: 
The world exists as no-thing. 
’Human beings construct their worlds actively out of their 
experience. 
Human experience is private. 
I 
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Hence, individually constructed worlds are private. 
Hence, the constructor knows best what he has constructed. 
Hence, the constructor knows best what comes next to keep 
the structure alive. 
Were I to list the individuals who have contributed to the 
writing of this piece, it would have to include every person I’ve 
ever met, every author of every book, article, movie, piece of music, 
etc., I've ever experienced. Some individuals stand out over others, 
and they are quoted or referred to throughout. If I have misinter¬ 
preted them or been led astray by them, then that is merely another 
demonstration of the extent of my biases and I make no apologies for 
it. If I have interpreted them as they intended or if I write things 
that fit the constructed worlds of others, I place the credit where 
it is due - in the biases of the influencers and the influenced. 
iii 
CHAPTER I 
There are two kinds of people in this world: those who 
divide the world into two kinds and those who do not. 
It is nothing new to characterize Western Philosophy as varia¬ 
tions on the basic theme of realism. The Western "common man" and 
the more sophisticated Western Scientist are both fairly naive 
realists.^ Perhaps, as Benjamin Lee Whorf would suggest,^ our 
language compels us to be realists, though, of course, we would like 
to think that the universe itself is the source of our compulsion. 
To put it simply, we tend to believe that the world, with all the 
characteristics that we perceive in it, exists independently of our 
observations of it. 
Our language, and our attitude toward our language, is more 
indicative of our basic realism than anything else. The preponder¬ 
ance of nouns and adjectives, for example, is no mere coincidence. 
Rather, it is an indication of the great extent to which we have 
categories for our perceptions of the world. But, even more impor¬ 
tantly, it is our attitude toward those nouns and adjectives which 
is crucial. When we say, for example, that a book is an "object" we 
mean that the book, independent of our contact with it, possesses 
certain characteristics (perhaps the primary characteristics noted by 
Locke)^ which, if we perceive them "correctly", make it fall naturally 
into a natural category of other things which possess the same 
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characteristics. The world, for us, exists whether we are there to 
see it or not. Furthermore, it exists with a host of ''natural" 
attributes ranging from primary and secondary characteristics to 
physical laws all of which merely await our discovery. 
"Discovery" is, in fact, the key word. We like to think that 
Newton discovered the laws of gravity in much the same way that 
Columbus discovered America. The laws of gravity, like America, were 
always "there", operating in the universe, merely awaiting a Newton 
to come along with sufficient objectivity and intelligence to find 
them. Indeed, it is in the progress of Western science, and in our 
conceptions of what that progress means and how it has occurred, that 
our realism is most evident (see Chapter III). We are, of course, 
willing to admit that some things are harder to "discover" than others, 
but even when we speak of the "mysteries of the universe" we see them 
as naturally existing mysteries awaiting a discoverer with sufficient 
vision to see them for what they "really" are. 
It is in this context of the knower as discoverer of the 
objective that some of the features of our language become a bit 
revealing. We tend to speak of the process of gaining knowledge 
primarily via the distal senses - sight and hearing. We see the truth. 
We have visions of Ultimate Reality. A right answer sounds right. 
Seeing is believing. It is, I would suggest, because we consider 
sight and hearing to be totally passive, undistorting sensory modes 
that we place so much confidence in them as means toward knowledge. 
i 
The sense of touch, for example, will simply not do as a means for us 
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to gain knowledge. For to touch something is to manipulate it, to 
change it through interaction with it, to be unsure of how much that 
one feels is in the thing and how much is in the feeler. It is not 
coincidence that we always see and hear knowledge, but never feel it. 
"I see" can substitute for "I understand", but "I feel" cannot. 
Why? Because we have convinced ourselves that seeing is a very simple 
process which does not change or distort what is coming into the mind 
from the world outside. The eye, we believe, is merely a window whose 
function it is to let the world come into the "mind's eye" as it 
"really" is. The psychological absurdity of these notions of percep¬ 
tion will be discussed later, for it is the implied philosophy of such 
a perspective, and the extent to which it permeates what we do, say, 
and even think that concerns me here. 
No matter how hard I might try, in 20th Century America, speaking 
and thinking in 20th Century American, I am doomed to look at the world 
through the blinders of some form of realism. My language and my 
entire cultural heritage demand of me that I see myself as an observer 
of a world which exists independently of me. I am constantly forced 
to speak of my "self" as a subject which is constantly trying to gain 
knowledge of objects. The subject is "naturally different from the 
object, and the object "naturally" possesses the characteristics which 
I can come to know if I am "objective" enough. The closest I can come 
to describing this notion of the universe which we constantly carry 
around is through the following picture: , 
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We, as observers, touch the world which is a separate entity from 
our "selves". The knowledge that we gain through touching (i.e., see¬ 
ing, hearing, smelling, tasting, etc.) the world is more accurate, 
more valid, the more "objective" it is. That is, the more impersonal 
my act of knowing is, the more I tend to believe that it is valid. 
The less of my self I see invested in my act of knowledge, the more 
I can believe that 1 have really learned something about that world 
outside of me. 
What is disastrously missing from such an account of the act of 
knowledge, typical though I think it is of a Western man's approach, 
is any awareness of the large amount of personal commitment which is 
required for knowledge of any kind. Indeed, the entire notion of 
"objective", "impersonal" knowledge is a ridiculous one. Even in 
Western, dualistic terms, knowledge is always knowledge £f something 
by someone. To equate the purest knowledge with the removal of the 
knower makes as little sense as it would to equate knowledge with 
removal of the thing known. As an ideal, objective knowledge is both 
impossible and ludicrous, a point which Michael Polanyi has made most 
adequately in his PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. 
Polanyi's argument is an interesting one, and though I don't 
believe he carries it fr.r enough, it represents a good starting point 
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for leaving the naive realism which I've been describing above and 
moving towards what I consider to be a more viable approach to the 
nature of knowledge. 
Polanyi argues that knowledge at all levels depends upon a 
personal commitment to ideas, values, or beliefs which are not in them¬ 
selves "known". I am able to know one thing only because I am deeply 
committed to something else which I do not, strictly, know. But, per¬ 
haps, Polanyi's own analogies will help explain his intent. His 
notions of "personal knowledge" and of the necessity for indefensible 
commitment as a foundation of all knowledge hinge on the following 
distinction between Pocal and Subsidiary awareness: 
When we use a hammer to drive in a nail, we attend to 
both nail and hammer, but in a different way. We watch 
the effect of our strokes on the nail and try to wield the 
hammer so as to hit the nail most effectively. When we 
bring down the hammer we do not feel that its handle has 
struck our palm and the fingers that hold the hammer... 
I have a subsidiary awareness of the feeling in the palm 
of my hand which is ^nerged into my focal awareness of my 
driving in the nail. 
There are several things which I see as crucial in the above 
quotation. First of all, my focal awareness of driving in the nail 
depends upon my subsidiary awareness of feelings in the palm of my 
hand. I cannot concentrate on driving in the nail unless I "surrender 
myself" to those feelings in the palm. Indeed, if I turn the focus 
of my attention to the feelings in the palm of my hand, I will no 
longer be able to drive in the nail. Furthermore, if I did focus 
attention' on the feelings in my palm, the act of doing so would 
require subsidiary awareness of, or personal commitment to, a host of 
6 
other matters. I cannot possibly be aware of all that I know, all that 
1 believe, all that I am doing, or all that I value at any particular 
time. And I cannot be aware of anything unless I surrender myself, 
commit myself, to a host of unanalyzed, unsupported ideas, values, 
and feelings. 
Polanyi’s over-all treatment of "subsidiary awareness" supplies 
the first step away from the naive realism which seems to me to per¬ 
vade the West. When, for example, I measure the length of a piece of 
wood and find myself able to say that "this piece of wood is 27 1/2" 
long", my participation in that act of knowledge and my confidence in 
its success rely upon my unquestioning commitment to a whole gamut of 
beliefs. And as soon as I turn my attention to those other beliefs, 
I have shattered my original act of knowledge. Measuring that board, 
for example, requires that I assume the accuracy of my tape measure, 
and if I begin to question (or even think about) that assumption I am 
no longer gaining knowledge of the length of the board. I cannot have 
focal and subsidiary awareness of the same thing at the same time. To 
be focally aware of anything requires that I have subsidiary awareness 
of many other things. And my subsidiary awareness is a matter of 
personal commitment, unquestioning loyalty, living in. In order to 
know anything, I must live in an entire system of beliefs which I do 
not and can not question. 
Polanyi’s treatment of personal knowledge raises one other issue 
which I find of much interest; he treats knowledge as an act of skill 
rather than as a product*, as a process rather than an end state. 
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Though much less explicitly than either Dewey5 or Whitehead,6 
Polanyi seems to be moving toward a cosmology-whose basic components 
are processes and experiences rather than things and ideas. The act 
of knowledge is defined by the knower’s experience, the process he 
is undergoing, and not by the product he gains through that process. 
Although Polanyi never comes out and says it, I suspect that he comes 
close to meaning by "He knows x" that "He has had the experience of 
living in x." 
Whether Polanyi intended to define knowledge as a process or not, 
I clo so intend and it is my difference with Polanyi on this point and 
on "living in" that will move us toward the cosmology I am proposing 
here. Rather than arguing, as Polanyi tends to, that knowledge 
requires skill, subsidiary awareness, and living in, I would contend 
that knowledge is^ subsidiary awareness. Knowledge is the process of 
living in. Furthermore, I consider the crucial element of "living in" 
to be the fact that it is a totally un-self-conscious process. That 
is, I have subsidiary awareness of the hammer in the palm of my hand 
only when I am totally unaware of my "self" "having" such sensations. 
To put the whole thing more bluntly, I_ gain knowledge of something 
when there is no "I" gaining knowledge and no "something" to be gained 
knowledge of. Or, to sound more Dewey-like, knowledge is neither 
subjective nor objective. Rather, it is the merging of subject and 
object; the erasure of the distinction between the knower and the 
thing known. , 
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The distinction between an act of knowledge as I would describe 
it and the same act as a realist might describe it can best be 
exemplified in the following accounts of the skill of a master chess 
player: 
REALIST: What makes the master chess player invincible 
is the fact that he is capable of "planning 
ahead" more moves than the average player. 
Each time a master chess player makes a move 
he has considered several other possibilities 
and consciously rejected them because of 
their foreseen consequences. The master chess 
player is able to carry the sequence "If I 
do this then he'll do this and I'll do this 
and he'll do this..." out to more terms than 
the average player. 
ME: Your description of the master chess player 
may apply to a good chess player, and it may 
describe a "stage" through which most masters 
go along the way toward becoming masters, 
but it does not describe the Master at work. 
The Master does not plan ahead self¬ 
consciously and analyze the merits of all 
possible moves. Rather, he concentrates on 
the board and the game until he is completely 
un-self-conscious ; until there is no master, 
no opponent, no chess game. The Master is 
able to live in the chess game he is playing 
and he moves with the pattern that i£ both 
he and the game. (My thanks are due to 
Stuart Thorsby^ a master chess player, for 
this example.) 
By his living in the game, by his discarding the distinction 
between himself and the game, the master chess player is participating 
in an act of knowledge as I would describe it, 
-Knowledge, as I am describing it, is a process and is defined by 
the feeling of the knower. Indeed, "I feel" seems to me to be much 
closer to "I understand" than is "I see." When a person achieves the 
feeling of total un-self-consciousness about whatever he is doing, he 
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is participating in an act of knowledge. What the person is doing 
is really irrelevant, for it could range from chess playing to read¬ 
ing a book to performing a chemistry experiment to making love. How 
the person does what he does, in what spirit, with what feeling, and 
with how much "awareness of self" - these are the things which define 
acts of knowledge. 
Such acts of knowledge have been described and analyzed by a host 
of other authors in a wide variety of different contexts. When 
William James x^rote about the varieties of mystical experience he was 
g 
describing such acts of knowledge. John Dewey’s descriptions of the 
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aesthetic experience amount to the same. Arthur Koestler’s analysis 
of creativity in humor, art, and science is an attempt to focus on 
such experiences.^ Descriptions in the history of science of "flashes 
of insight" (Archimedes' bathtub experience, or Galileo's confidence 
in s=l/2gt , or Kekule's carbon-chain dreams or Watson and Crick's 
immersion in their atomic models...) have the same subject. The 
Zen literature from its Koan's to its tales of satori speaks of such 
acts of knowledge.12 The more recent psychedelic literature is focused 
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almost entirely on describing such "non-self" experiences. And this 
list could go on and on and on. 
But, interestingly enough, some of the most vivid and meaningful 
descriptions of the act of knowledge come from the world of the 
schizophrenic (a fact which I will take up in a later chapter). 
Consider, for example, the following description taken from Karl 
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Jaspers' GENERAL PSYCHOPATHOLOGY: 
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I believe I caused the illness myself. In my attempt to 
penetrate the other world I met its natural guardians, the 
embodiment of my own weaknesses and faults. I first thought 
these demons were lowly inhabitants of the other world who 
would play me like a ball because I went into these regions 
unprepared and lost my way. Later I thought they were split- 
off parts of my own mind which existed near me in free space 
and thrived on my feelings. I believed everyone else had 
these too but did not perceive them, thanks to the protective 
successful deceit of the feeling of personal existence. I 
thought the latter was an artifact of memory, thought-complexes, 
etc. , a doll that was nice enough to look at from outside 
but nothing real inside it. 
In my case the personal self had grown porous because of 
my dimmed consciousness. Through it I wanted to bring myself 
closer to the higher sources of life. I should have prepared 
myself for this over a long period by invoking in me a higher, 
impersonal self, since ’nectar’ is not for mortal lips. It 
acted destructively on the animal-human self, split it up into 
its parts. These gradually disintegrated, the doll was really 
broken and the body damaged. I had forced untimely access to 
the ’source of life,’ the curse of the ’gods’ descended on me. 
I recognized too late that murky elements had taken a hand. 
I got to know them after they had already too much power. 
There was no way back. I now had the world of spirits I had 
wanted to see. . The demons came up from the abyss, as 
guardian Cerberi, denying admission to the unauthorized. I 
decided to take up the life-and-death struggle. This meant 
for me in the end a decision to die, since I had to put 
aside everything that maintained the enemy, but this was 
also everything that maintained life. I wanted to enter 
death without going mad and stood before the Sphinx: either 
thou into the abyss or i! 
Then came illumination. I fasted and so penetrated into 
the true nature of my seducers. They were pimps and deceivers 
of my dear personal self which seemed as much a thing of 
naught as they. A larger and more comprehensive self emerged 
and I could abandon the previous personality with its entire 
entourage. I saw this earlier personality could never enter 
transcendental realms. I felt as a result a terrible pain, 
like an annihilating blow, but I was rescued, the demons 
shriveled, vanished and perished. A new life began for me 
and from now on I felt different from other people. A self 
that consisted of conventional lies, shams, self-deceptions, 
memory images, a self just like that of other people, grew 
in me again but behind and above it stood a greater and more 
comprehensive self rfhich impressed me with something of what 
is eternal, unchanging, immortal and inviolable and which 
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ever since that time has been my protector and refuge. I 
believe it would be good for many if they were acquainted 
with such a higher self and that there are people who have 
attained this goal in fact by kinder means. 
Similar descriptions of "ego-loss" experiences, acts of knowledge, 
abound in much of the existential literature15 and in such lucid 
compilations of the experiences of schizophrenics as Bert Kaplan's 
THE INNER WORLD OF MENTAL ILLNESS.16 
Certainly, deeply religious experiences are precisely the same 
kind of thing and at a level of intensity equal to or greater than 
that described above. As R.D. Laing argues in his excellent THE 
POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE, 
Most people most of the time experience themselves and 
others in one or another way that I shall call egoic. That 
is, centrally or peripherally, they experience the world 
and themselves in terms of a consistent identity, a me-here 
over against a you-there, within a framework of certain 
ground structures of space and time shared with other members 
of their society. 
...all religious and all existential philosophers have 
agreed that such egoic experience is a preliminary illusion, 
a veil, a film of maya — a dream to Heraclitus, and to 
Lao Tzu, the fundamental illusion of all Buddhism, a state 
of sleep, of death, of socially accepted madness, a womb 
state to which one has to die, from which one has to be 
born. 
The ’ego1 is the instrument for living in this world. 
If the ’ego’ is broken up or destroyed (by the insurmountable 
contradictions of certain life situations, by toxins, chemical 
changes, etc.), then the person may be exposed to other 
worlds, ’real' in different ways from the more familiar 
territory of dreams, imagination, perception or fantasy. 
What I am calling an act of knowledge is not, except in my will 
ingness to allow for such experiences in much less intense manners, 
different from the above accounts. Nor do I see any difference in 
the following taken from the Gospel according to Thomas: 
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Jesus said to them: 
When you make the two one, and 
when you make the inner as the outer 
and the outer as the inner and the above 
as the below, and when 
you make the male and female into a single one, 
so that the male will not be the male and 
the female not be female, when you make 
eyes in the place of an eye, and a foot in the place 
of a foot, and an image in the place of an image, 
then shall you enter the Kingdom. 
CHAPTER IX 
WHAT WE THINK IS LESS THAN WHAT WE KNOW; 
WHAT WE KNOW IS LESS THAN WHAT WE LOVE; 
WHAT WE LOVE IS SO MUCH LESS THAN WHAT THERE IS; 
AND TO THAT PRECISE EXTENT WE ARE SO MUCH LESS THAN 
WHAT WE ARE. 
If the act of knowledge is to be conceived as I have described it, 
then the world must exist in quite a different manner than we, as 
realists, tend to assume. If knowledge is feeling, ego-loss, process, 
then the "real* world must be built of different stuff than we normally 
assume. Let me begin to describe what the world must be like if acts 
of knowledge as I have described them are to be taken seriously. 
An nact of knowledge" in any philsophical scheme, including mine, 
must have something to do with the "knower" getting in touch with 
"reality". The question to which this chapter must address itself, 
then, is the ontological one of what kind of "reality" it is that a 
person gains knowledge of by living in. If knowledge is not gained in 
the traditionally described manner, if verbalization is not a key 
component of knowledge, and if ego-loss is crucial to knowledge, then 
the world of language-bound concepts and categories must be illusory 
in some sense of the word. To put it more radically and succinctly, 
the world is "really" an undifferentiated whole which we have become 
accustomed to slicing up in arbitrary manners, There are no naturally 
existing categories in the world, and any such categories which we use 
are our arbitrary inventions. The fact that human beings use and per¬ 
ceive the world through conceptual schemes says more about the way in 
is which man shapes his perceptual world than about what the ''world" 
like. The world exists naturally as "no-thing" until man comes along 
and creates things through his active processes of perception (see 
Chapter VI) . 
Consider some simple examples. There is a new book sitting on 
my desk which I have never seen before. I look at the front of it, 
then walk around the desk and look at it upside down. My two percep¬ 
tions (the book cover right-side-up and the book cover upside down) 
are completely different. The two visual fields have nothing in common 
And yet, I comfortably say that I am "seeing the same thing" in both 
cases. The "thing" that I see is my_ creation, not the world's. If I 
find it easy to attribute those two perceptions to an "object" called 
a "book" which exists independently of me with definable characteris¬ 
tics, that is because I have arbitrarily created for myself a whole 
system of categories for looking at the world. It is the system of 
categories that requires me to see a "book", not the "pure" infor¬ 
mation from the world. 
The arbitrariness of our "slicing up" of reality is, of course, 
more obvious in the words and concepts that we use than in our per¬ 
ceptions of the world. It is not terribly difficult, for example, for 
us as realists to admit of a certain amount of fuzziness in distin 
guishing between such abstract categories as "life" and "death". 
When it comer, to answering such questions as "Is a man dead when his 
heart stops even though most of the cells in his body are still alive? 
we will admit to a certain amount of high-handedness in arbitrarily 
drawing a line somewhere. But we will continue to insist that the two 
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categories are 'basically" sound - that a living man is naturally 
different from a non-living rock, And, much more fundamentally, we 
will insist that the perceived separateness of different objects is, 
indeed, natural and not dictated by our arbitrary whims. After all, 
we would insist, "I" am a different "thing" from the "typewriter" I 
am now using. But, am I? "Really"? 
If the world is more like the above picture than the picture on 
page four, Chapter I, then am I? "Really"? 
Let us consider, for the moment as a possibility only, the "real 
world" as depicted in the picture above. In such a world, all distinc¬ 
tions, all categorizations, all "slicings up" of the world are in¬ 
accurate, for the world is "really" an undifferentiated whole. Any 
distinctions between objects or characteristics that are made in such 
a world are inaccurate in the sense that they are arbitrary, man-made, 
and not dictated by the nature of the world. In such a world, the 
words and categories which human beings employ are arbitrary and not 
required by naturally existing differences among "objects" in the 
world. I must also note that in such a world of complete lack of 
differentiations, one can, if he chooses, divide the world up into 
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categories in an infinite number of ways, all of which will "work" 
equally well. A world which is not divided into parts at all can 
b<2 categorized in an infinite number of ways. Just as I can take a 
piece of clean white paper and cut it up in an infinitude on manners, 
so can I arbitrarily impose an infinitude of category systems of an 
undifferentiated world. 
Most importantly, the existence of a reality which is completely 
undifferentiated requires us to give up our fundamental distinction 
between subject and object. As depicted in the figure above, the sub¬ 
ject which touches the world is^ the world which it touches. The dis¬ 
tinction between subject and object, knower and the known, is as 
artificial a contrivance as any other set of categories which we might 
impose on the world. The point whereat a person decides that his 
"self" ends and the "world" begins is as arbitrary a distinction as 
any of the others which we make. Does my "self", include all of my 
body, or only part of it, or none of it? Does it include the clothes 
I am wearing? ify most valued possessions? My most intimate friends? 
The answers to such questions are arbitrary and whimsical, since "in 
fact" the assumption that there is some naturally valid distinction 
between self and non-self is an invalid one. 
Perhaps an analogy will help to describe the undifferentiated 
world as I would have the reader see it, though the ontology I am 
describing makes analogizing, and verbal description of any kind, a 
dangerous and shaky business. A world which has no naturally existing 
categories cannot be described adequately in words which are, by 
definition, categories. For the reader who wishes to see as good a 
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verbal description of the non-verbal world as I can imagine, I 
recommend the last chapter of R.D. Laing's THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE.1 
By emphasizing certain aspects of recent developments in laser 
beam photography, however, I can come close to supplying a useful 
analogy for describing the naturally uncategorized world. The method 
produces a photographic plate, called a "hologram", which has interest¬ 
ing properties. Looked at in natural light, the hologram is merely a 
mass of wavy, orange-red lines - interference patterns of light 
produced in the process of making the "photograph". But when the 
entire plate is illuminated from behind by high intensity light, the 
object photographed appears in color, with three dimensions, and depth 
of field (i.e. by moving one’s head to the side of the hologram, one 
can see around and behind objects in the picture). And if any small 
piece of the hologram is illuminated with a high intensity light, the 
entire photograph is visible, still in color, three dimensions, and 
with depth of field. The entire picture is contained in the totality 
of the hologram, as well as in every point of the hologram. 
The world is like a hologram. Every point is exactly the same as 
every other point, and every point is exactly the same as the whole 
which is exactly the same as any combination of points. The analogy 
breaks down at only one place: when we talk about the hologram we can 
speak of separate points which we can distinguish from one another by 
their location in space. The world is like a hologram in which nothing 
can get outside to distinguish the separate points. 
’’There is no way to step off the treadmill. 
It is all treadmill." (Wallace Stegner, ALL THE LITTLE 
LIVE THINGS)2 
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Or, if you prefer, the world is like a hologram without distinguish¬ 
able points. 
Before proceeding to defend this conception of the world as 
hologram, a few words must be said about words. A reality which is 
undivided cannot be adequately described by any process which divides, 
and language is by nature such a process. To merely utter a word is 
to divide a reality which is not, in itself, divided. The world as 
hologram and knowledge as "living in" are simply not susceptible to 
adequate verbalization since the very use of words negates the crucial 
notion of unity. On the other hand, it would be far from the mark 
for the reader to conclude that the ontology which I am describing 
requires human beings to refrain from ever using words. For words, 
like every "thing" else in the world are points on the hologram, there¬ 
by containing all that the world is. To put it another way, one can 
as easily (or with as much difficulty) live in language as one can 
live in anything else. The dangers and advantages of language are the 
same as the dangers and advantages of non-language, for knowledge is 
an act, a process, not a "thing". Consider the following Haiku poem: 
The old pond. 
A frog jumps in, 
The sound of water. 
Insofar as we analyze, divide, interpret, project symbolism and in 
any other way separate ourselves or the world from the poem, we are not 
gaining knowledge. But insofar as we live in the poem, feel it, feel 
ourselves in it and it in ourselves, we are gaining knowledge - the 
same knowledge, in fact, that the master chess player is gaining, for 
all points of the world-hologram are the same. 
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Any situation in which a human being finds himself is potentially 
a source of knowledge, including those situations which require the 
use of language. The point is not so much that language is "bad" 
but that it is a mistake to equate any verbal statement with knowl¬ 
edge. For knowledge is a process, a feeling, an experience which may 
or may not involve the use of language. And the same kind of argument 
applies to language as a communicator of knowledge. If you, reader, 
are living in the words you are reading, then I have communicated 
knowledge tc you in the sense of having provided the context for an 
act of knowledge. Somewhat more intensely, if I am living in as I 
write and you are living in as you read, then we are communicating, at 
least vicariously. And more intensely still, if you and I ever have a 
conversation (verbal or non-verbal) wherein we live in each other, 
then we are communicating indeed. Once again, communication cannot 
be equated with the words used or even the lack thereof. Rather, it 
is an act, a feeling, an experience which may or may not employ 
language. 
Besides providing opportunities for living in, words can also 
have the function of leading people toward the experience of knowledge. 
A verbal tract like this one might, for example, be the goad which 
eventually leads some reader to experience an act of knowledge which 
he might otherwise not have experienced. Far more likely, the lengthy 
and profound consideration of some verbal puzzle might lead to such an 
experience. Clearly, such is the intent of the Zen Koan. If one can 
immerse oneself deeply enough in the consideration of such a question 
as "What is the sound of one hand clapping?" one might well lose one’s 
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self and thereby experience knowledge. Similarly, I would claim, the 
deep reflection on any verbal statement or on any word can achieve 
the same end. If the reader has the forebearance to think lengthily 
about any question or any word he thereby opens himself to the 
possibility of discarding his self, seeing through the words, and 
experiencing knowledge. 
But consideration of language and its functions, as well as of 
differences in language from culture to culture, also supplies an 
avenue for supporting the notion of the world-hologram. In addition 
to the large intra-cultural differences in language structure, there 
are systematic and significant differences in the structure of 
languages of different cultures. And, as Benjamin Lee Whorf long ago 
pointed out, the structure of a cultureTs language to some extent 
determines the way in which the world is seen in that culture. It 
simply makes no sense to ask which language is a more valid represen¬ 
tation of the world. The world is irrepresentable in language, and 
any language which arbitrarily divides it into categories can be made 
to ’'work” as well as any other. Unless one is willing to tolerate the 
notion that some languages are "better" than others as describers of 
the "real" world, one must begin to make room for the notion that 
there is an undifferentiated world out there which can be "handled" 
by an infinite number of languages. 
Consider the by now classic example of Eskimo words for snow. 
There are well over half-a-dozen different words for snow in the Eskimo 
language, each of which refers to a different kind of snow. The 
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distinctions made by those words are ones which we who use English 
customarily overlook. We simply do not slice that "part" of the world 
up as systematically as do Eskimoes. Similarly, there are realms of 
time distinctions and social-class—politeness distinctions in the 
Japanese language which we have never even considered making. We do 
not slice the world up that way, and part of the reason is that our 
language provides no avenues for doing so. It does not force us to 
make some distinctions which Japanese does force on its users. Now, 
the question of "Which language is ’right'?" is obviously an absurd 
one. The different languages represent rather drastically different 
modes of categorizing the world and, since there are no "natural" 
categories in the world, none of the languages are ultimately "right", 
all are equally in error by virtue of having made the same mistake, 
and all can serve the valuable functions of communicating and leading 
toward acts of knowledge that I have described above. 
There will be those who would claim that the spectacular rise of 
science in modem times represents the attainment of a "universal 
language" and thereby a valid set of categories for describing the 
universe. And it is quite clear that modern, technological societies 
do, indeed, look to Science for answers to questions regarding the 
"real" nature of the world. The important point is that when one looks 
at the process of science carefully, as we shall do in the succeeding 
chapter, one finds that the nice, neat category systems, the theories 
of the universe, and the carefully designed models are as arbitrary 
and ultimately indefensible as any other attempt to slice the world into 
parts. 
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Despite widespread difference, Twentieth Century philosophers of 
science tend to agree on one crucial point: that scientific knowledge 
can never be either complete or certain, Some would argue that knowl¬ 
edge of reality is at best probabilistic;^ some would argue that 
scientific models are at best abstractions which can be more or less 
useful, but never known to be true, and some would argue that the 
degree of personal commitment involved in knowledge of any kind makes 
"objective'' knowledge impossible.6 Poincare,7 as far back as the begin¬ 
ning of this century, has proved to his satisfaction (and to that of 
many others) that the total realm of existing "facts" concerning the 
world at any time, can always be explained by an infinite number of 
theories. That is, the "universe of experience" which any man or man¬ 
kind has on hand at any time, can be sliced up, explained, and 
accounted for in an infinite number of ways. No surprise if the world 
is the undifferentiated hologram I have been describing. 
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In a somewhat more sophisticated manner, Tarski has developed a 
similar proof: 
In a logical demonstration closely akin to the proof of 
Godel's theorems, Tarski has shown that any formal system in 
which we could assert a sentence and also reflect on the 
truth of its assertion must be self-contradictory. Thus, in 
particular, the assertion that any theorem of a given formal 
language is true, can be made onl^ by a sentence that is 
meaningless within that language. 
To put the conclusion more simply, if I say "That is a book" and 
then say "It is true that that is a book," I have contradictec myself 
(see Tarski's proof, if you desire a good deal of rigor), And if I 
i 
say "That is a book" and then wish to reflect on the truth of that 
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statement, I can only do so in a language that has no meaning in 
En?3-i.sh. A vicious bind for one who would describe the secrets of 
the universe via language. A commonplace for one who feels the 
undifferentiatedness of the world-hologram. 
In a sense, then, I would take these descriptions of the difficul¬ 
ties of science and the varieties of language across cultures as 
evidence for the world-hologram ontology. But, at the same time, I 
must caution the reader against taking the word "evidence" too serious¬ 
ly within my framework. Language and the canons of logic are not 
grounds for evidence in. such a world. If categorization is misleading, 
then self-contradiction is no more so and, in fact, might be less so. 
From my framex^ork, the statement "Black is white" makes as much sense, 
if not more so, than the statement "black is black." Evidence, within 
my scheme, must always be experience, feeling - an act of knowledge. 
Ultimately, "evidence" for the ontology which I have presented 
can only lie in the personal experience of individuals. I would, in 
fact, urge the reader to survey his personal experiences for instances 
of what I have been calling "living in." I would be surprised if many 
readers could find examples of "loss-of-self" experiences in their 
lives that approach the intensity of those cited in Chapter I. I would 
be equally surprised, hox^ever, if any reader failed to find such 
experiences in his life on a less grandiose scale. 
Extreme proficiency at any skill would provide opportunities for 
knowledge experiences as I have defined them. Driving a car, 
participation in sports, craftsmanship, artistic creation, scientific 
insight (the experience, not the later verbalization), dancing, musical 
24 
performance - any act which so absorbs the actor that he no longer 
exists as an actor. But "living in" can occur passively, too. Gazing 
at a sunset can be an act of knowledge insofar as the observer is 
thereby divested of his self—hood, Reading a book or poem, listening 
to music, watching a dramatic performance, looking at a work of art 
or of nature - all can be acts of knowledge if and only if the 
observer is not separated from the observed. If he lives in it, 
experiences himself as it, i£ it. 
To document the occurrence of such experiences in the history of 
mankind seems to me an unnecessary endeavour at this point. William 
James and others have done it for religious experiences.^ 
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R.D. Laing, Bert Kaplan and others have done it for "psychopathic" 
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experiences. John Dewey, Susan Langer, and others have done it 
for aesthetics. Alfred North Whitehead,^ Jean Paul Sartre,^ Alan 
17 18 Watts, D.T. Suzuki and others have done it for philosophy. 
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Michael Polanyi, Alan Taton, Arthur Koestler, and many others have 
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done it for science. And Susan Langer, Arthur Koestler, and 
others have done it for everything in their attempts to tie all 
creativity and knowledge (artistic, scientific, dramatic, literary, 
humorous, etc.) under one rubric. The existence of such experiences 
has been thoroughly documented. Their "meaning" has been frequently 
discussed, analyzed, and argued. Conviction, commitment, and knowl¬ 
edge of the world-hologram can only come through the reader, not 
from external verbiage. 
What we think is less than what we know; 
What we know is less than what we love; 
What we love is so much less than what there is; 
And to that precise extent we are so much less than 
what we are. 
Or, if you prefer: 
There is no way to step off the treadmill. 
It is all treadmill. 
Your move, reader. 
CHAPTER III 
The real world has become so fantastic that satire... 
is discouraged because reality outdistances it. 
The dispassionate intellect, the open mind, the 
unprejudiced observer, exist in an exact sense only in a 
sort of intellectualist folk-lore,,.. 
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to over—emphasize the 
influence which the Scientific Revolution has had upon the life and 
thinking of Western Man. To be sure, such influences (and especially 
this particular one) are reciprocal and I have no desire to argue 
over chicken-and-the-egg questions here. However one looks at it, 
popular notions of the scientific process and its philosophy seem to 
me to be excellent indicators, in the Western world, of the popular 
Weltanschauung. The common man’s philosophy of science tends to be 
his philosophy of the universe, because we all tend to see Science as 
the most legitimate approach to Truth. 
I need to talk at some length about Philosophy of Science, then, 
because of its importance as a barometer of popular philsophy. 
Furthermore, this chapter on Science will serve as a bridge between 
the more general philosophy described in the preceding chapters and 
the highly specific psychological models described in subsequent 
chapters. 
If Western Man is a realist in his basic view of the world, he 
is a super-realist in his perspective on Science, When we talk about 
the high points in the history of science, we speak of "discoveries, 
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Scientists report their "findings" in journals. The basic "stuff" of 
science is data (i.e. "things given") which are better the more they 
are untouched by human hands and minds. Laws and experiments are more 
valid the more objective they are — i.e. the less they reflect the 
commitment and biases of human beings. The laws, harmonies, and order 
of the physical universe are "out there" waiting for us to discover 
them, and we are most likely to do so if we can strip away our biases 
and preconceptions. Science does not impose order on a chaotic 
universe, it searches for the system which is already there, however 
deeply and mysteriously hidden. 
Let us look at some classic examples of this view of science 
which I claim to be the currently predominate one. Galileo rolled some 
balls down some inclined planes. He measured the distance the balls 
moved in various time intervals. The measurements were made with as 
exacting care as could be in those days. Galileo then looked at those 
’’data", computed the acceleration of the balls down the planes, and 
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thereby discovered the Law of Falling Bodies (s=l/2gt ). The "Law" 
virtually sprang forth at him from the objective data, 
Johannes Kepler, having spent years immersed in a storehouse of 
accurate data on the movements of planets, finally sees his Three Laws. 
The data, accumulated over many years by many people (particularly 
Tycho Brahe) who were relatively unbiased and therefore objective, 
forced Kepler to come to the conclusions that he eventually arrived at. 
The three laws of planetary motion were, if you will, embedded in the 
data, awaiting the keen insight of a man like Kepler to discover them. 
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Robert Boyle, perhaps the most objective data-gatherer that 
science has ever seen, discovered Boyle’s Law by inspecting some 
accurate data regarding air in a j-tube. The unbiased organization 
of those data revealed the fact that pressure and volume of a gas vary 
systematically with one another. It required the careful, unbiased 
talents of a Boyle to gather data which were sufficiently uncontami¬ 
nated to arrive at the measurements of pressure and volume which 
revealed Boyle's Law. 
Gregor Mendel spent the major portion of his life raising flowers 
systematically cross-fertilizing them, and carefully recording the 
attributes of the resulting off-spring. Over a period of years, the 
data showed certain regularities and systematic relationships between 
the traits of off-spring and the traits of ancestors. Upon inspecting 
these masses of results, Mendell discovered his basic Laws of Genetics 
Kekule, the father of organic carbon-ring chemistry, arrived at 
the conclusion that the benzene molecule has a ring structure through 
careful analysis of detailed data regarding the chemical properties 
of benzene. Experiments with benzene, comparisons of its chemical 
properties and behavior with that of other straight-line organic 
compounds, convinced Kekule that benzene could not possibly be such a 
molecule and that it had to be structured like a ring in order for if 
to behave as the data showed that it does. 
We could go on, but, after all, enough is enough. I shuuld, 
perhaps, apologize for setting up such a straw man, but I'm not sure 
that I have done so. I know of too many 19th century philosophers of 
science (and of history and a few other things, for that matter) who 
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argued in precisely such a vein. I know of too many social scientists 
in the Twentieth Century who see their science in such a light. And 
I know of too many non-scientists who see all of science as such an 
objective process of discovery, to be able to dismiss the argument as 
a strawman. If the view of science implied in the above historical 
accounts seems incredibly naive and weak to the reader, it is not be¬ 
cause no one has that view. It might, in fact, be wise for the reader 
to stop at this point and analyze his reactions to those paragraphs. 
Do the descriptions seem plausible? Do they represent the process of 
science as you tend to view it? If not, where do they fall short? 
In order to describe the process of science in what I consider to 
be a more accurate light and spirit, let me recount the "discoveries" 
I have mentioned above in a somewhat different manner. Galileo, 
upon inspecting a series of fairly inaccurate measurements of balls 
rolling down inclined planes, manipulated them so as to produce a 
systematic, harmonious relationship. The shere harmony, beauty, and 
simplicity of that relationship, and the number series it produced, 
convinced Galileo that his equations were correct. Galileo was 
intuitively certain of his equation and felt a strong personal commit¬ 
ment to it. He then proceeded to conduct a host of experiments with 
balls rolling down inclined planes (and his heart as a time piece!). 
Although the "data" were sloppy and thus far from, in themselves, 
confirming nis conclusions, he considered them to be close enough to 
what he knew, intuitively, was right to consider them as evidence for 
his conclusions: 
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Here we have a typical example of Galileo’s method in 
physics: Imagine the conditions of a given situation, 
make a mathematical formulation and derive the reasonable 
consequences, then make a rough check, if it seems necessary, 
to be sure that the result is correct. ...In 'experiments 
near an hundred times repeated,’ Galileo found that the 
times agreed with the law, with no differences ’worth 
mentioning. His conclusion that the differences were not 
worth mentioning only shows how firmly he had made up his 
mind beforehand, for the rough conditions of the experiment 
would never have yielded an exact law. Actually, the 
discrepancies were so great that a contemporary worker, Pere 
Mersenne could not reproduce the results described by Galileo 
and even doubted that he had ever made the experiment.^ 
In his DIALOGUE ON THE TWO GREAT SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD, Galileo 
has one of his characters ask whether he had made an experiment on a 
given point, to which Galileo responds: 
No, and I do not need it, as without any experience I can 
affirm that it is so, because it cannot be otherwise.^ 
Kepler, immersing himself for years in detailed observations of 
planetary motion and, in particular, a small discrepancy in the orbit 
of Mars, had what can best be described as a "religious conversion" 
or "flash of insight" which convinced him irrevocably that the Earth 
was not the center of the universe, and that his Three Laws of 
Planetary Motion were True. Kepler's belief in his three laws was 
particular confirmed to him by the fact that they provided a framework 
within which complete harmony and geometric unity could be seen in 
the universe via a system of regular geometric solids progressing out- 
wards from the Sun. Thus confirmed in his views, Kepler spent well 
over three years monkeying with the data on Mars in order to get it to 
fit into his scheme of things. Eventually, of course, he succeeded 
and all seemed well. But it is at least somewhat ironic to note that 
Kepler was a terrible mathematician, and was saved in his calculations 
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only by the fact that his arithmetic errors cancelled each other out. 
When one runs Kepler's original data through a computer, one gets 
very nearly the same results as Kepler achieved, but one also finds 
he made thousands of arithmetic errors which happened to cancel 
each other out. In any case, Kepler "knew he was right" long before 
he turned to the data for confirmation. 
Boyle is an even more interesting case. He was, indeed, one of 
the most "objective" data-gatherer's that science has ever seen. In 
fact, he spent the major portion of his life gathering and recording 
data in minute detail - most of which has never been used, and never 
will be since it relates to no theory that anybody cares about at the 
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moment. Boyle conducted his J-tube experiments in order to disprove 
one of the going theories about nature's abhorrence of a vacuum, and 
having done so he characteristically stored away in a closet all his 
detailed observations on the levels of mercury in the tube. It took 
one of Boyle's assistants, considerably more theoretically inclined 
than he and much' interested in the then current notions of atmospheric 
pressure, to weed through those j-tube data, organize them in a 
highly abstract way, and invent the system of equations that could 
come close to making them all fit. Boyle was, if you will, far too 
"objective" to be able to invent Boyle's Law. 
Mendel is, perhaps, one of the best examples of science taking 
its own realism too seriously. Mendel's data in support of his laws 
of genetics are, to put it bluntly, much too well in agreement with 
his theory to have been "real". Replication of Mendel's experiments 
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has always shown a much larger spread of data, and though general 
agreement with the Laws still pertains the fit is never anywhere near 
as close as Mendel claims to have gotten.5 What seems to have 
happened is that Mendel's personal commitment to the laws was so 
intense that he manipulated his data quite substantially in order to 
show extremely close agreement with his theory. The moral for 
scientists is fairly clear - if you’re going to fudge your data to 
make the theory you believe in look good, don’t make it look too good 
or it will look bad, 
Kekule’s descriptions of the process whereby he arrived at his 
benzene ring hypothesis are among the most honest and revealing 
documents in the history of science, Kekule did immerse himself deep¬ 
ly in the data on benzene and was dissatisfied with current explana¬ 
tions of the structure of that compound, but the data did not give him 
any guide as to what that structure might be. The guide and 
inspiration, and the conviction in his ideas, came from his dreams. 
I turned my chair to the fire and dozed. .. .Again the 
atoms were gambolling before my eyes, This time the smaller 
groups kept modestly in the background, My mental eye, rendered 
more acute by repeated visions of this kind, could now 
distinguish larger structures, of manifold conformation; long 
rows, sometimes more closely fitted together; all twining and 
twisting in snakelike motion. But look! What was that? One 
of the snakes has seized hold of its tail, and the form 
whirled mockingly before my eyes. As if by a fl^ash of light¬ 
ning I awoke...Let us learn to dream, gentlemen. 
Kekule’s certainty came from a dream, not from his data. 
The process of science, as I am describing it, is a far more 
personal enterprise than we commonly believe. And the traditional 
arguments that science gains its values through its objectivity or 
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"usefulness” or "predictive value" seem to me to be little more than 
smokescreens which obscure the intensity of the scientists' commit¬ 
ment to his work. The scientist is, after all, a creator, not a dis¬ 
coverer, Galileo's laws of falling bodies, Kepler's Three Laws of 
Planetary Motion, Boyle's Law, Mendel's Laws of Genetics, and Kekule's 
benzene-ring model are creations which can be, and have been, imposed 
on a universe which is sublimely indifferent to systematization. The 
- value of those creations, and the commitment to their validity, has 
its origins in the creative act of the scientist, in his feeling of 
commitment, in his flash of insight or "Eureka" experience. Science 
can no more be "objective" than any other human enterprise, for it 
rests on the personal values, biases, and feelings of those who engage 
in science. And, in a very real sense, the entire super-structure of 
science is little more than rationalization and extension of the 
collective biases of scientists who see the world through similar sets 
of rose-colored glasses. 
The argument will be made, as it has been so frequently in the 
Twentieth Century, that the validity of a scientific theory resides 
in its utility, its ability to predict future events. A theory which 
gives accurate predictions is "probably true" and one which does not 
is "probably false," But the simple-mindedness of that explanation 
leaves all too much out of the scientific picture. If, for example, 
vt believe scientific theories on the basis of their accurate predic- 
tions, then why have we bought Einstein's General Theory of Relativity 
in the complete absense of confirmation of his three predictions? 
And why have Miller's experiments, replications of the Michelson- 
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Morley experiment which contradict the Special Theory of Relativity, 
been relegated to oblivion?7 Even more importantly, what do we do 
with Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle which, in essence, claims 
that we can never predict accurately? 
The images of Science as Predictability and Utility are little 
more than extensions of our wish to believe in the objectivity of 
science. We like to think that theories, admittedly developed by men, 
are capable of proving themselves wrong or right with virtually no 
interference from human bias. If a theory’s predictions bear out, it 
is true, if not it is false. But we continually neglect in such neat 
formulations the crucial element of human conviction and commitment. 
To a large extent, the theories of Galileo or Mendel or Einstein have 
led to successful predictions because we believed in them. If we are 
looking for answers that confirm a theory, we will find them, and if 
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we are not, we will not. When we believe in a theory, we accept 
sloppy data that confirm it easily, and we work hard to reject tight 
data that discorifirm it. This is not to say that data are totally 
irrelevant to Science, but it is to say that data is much less relevant 
to the convictions of individual scientists than we like to believe. 
The irony of the situation is that the individual scientist is far less 
liekly to be convinced by data than is the non-scientist. The 
scientist is persuaded by his dreams, his insights, his convictions, 
end his visions. The laymen is convinced by words and numbers he 
doesn’t understand, but which carry the weight of the scientist s 
personal conviction shrouded in what has, for us, become a Holy Lang- 
9 
uage. 
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The reader who finds my arguments against predictability and 
-utility as the basis of scientific validity to be intriguing but 
unsatisfactory would do well to inspect Michael Polanyi’s PERSONAL 
KNOWLEDGE, Polanyi’s treatment of these matters is considerably more 
systematic and well-documented than anything I could do here, and his 
conclusions are essentially the same as mine on this point. The 
scientist constantly reassures himself and his public that he won't 
believe anything until he sees it whereas, in fact, he won’t see 
anything until he believes it, If, in science, to see is to believe, 
than it is at least as much the case that to believe is to see. 
If we confront a scientist (or anyone else, for that matter) 
with that nasty little question that five-year-olds are always asking, 
’’why?", we will inevitably drive him to the same fundamental basis of 
his theorizing: "Because!” Though we would always like to think 
there is more, the rock on which our beliefs and theories about the 
universe must always be founded is our own, intensely personal commit¬ 
ment to the perspectives, ideals , and values that we hold, 
Relativistic as this stance toward the process of science may be, 
it is crucial to keep in mind that I in no way intend to belittle the 
value of scientific endeavour. Whenever one tries to argue that the 
foundation of what human beings believe is their belief itself - their 
emotional attachment and commitment - one always finds that people 
react by coiiduding that all endeavour based on such weak, personal 
" premises is worthless. But such is not the case, at least in my view: 
"It is one thing to say that ’values are only relative.’ 
Quite another to remove the pejorative adverb and assert 
’There are relative values! 
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To claim that science is worthless because it rests only on the 
biases and emotions of scientists is, in my estimation, to grossly 
misplace one's emphasis and grossly devalue the so-called "affective" 
aspects of human beings, The crucial, valuable thing about science, 
as about all human endeavour (see Chapter I), is that experience of 
commitment and involvement which is denied value by the statement 
"Values are only relative." 
The value of science lies in its "Moments of Truth" as Arthur 
Koestler has called them. They are the "Eureka" experiences, the 
flashes of insight, the "great" discoveries which shake the ages and 
leave masses of work for technicians who wish to "prove" the validity 
of what the discoverer already knows. These intuitive experiences 
are what scientists, and human beings in general, live for. They are 
acts of knowledge as I have described them elsewhere, and the 
verbalizations of science are little more than attempts to communicate 
those experiences and lead others to have similar ones. Compare the 
following descriptions of scientists at the moment of truth, with 
Chapter I’s descriptions and anecdotal accounts of mystical experiences. 
There is, I claim, no detectable difference: 
Just at this time I left for Caen, where I was then 
living, to go on a geological excursion under the auspices 
of the school of mines. The changes of travel made me 
forget my mathematic work. Having reached Countances, we 
entered an omnibus to go some place or another. At the 
moment when I put my foot on the step the idea came to me, 
without anything in my former thoughts seeming to have 
paved the way for it, that the transformations I had used 
to define the Fuschian functions were identical with those 
of non-Euclidean geometry. I did not verify the idea; I 
should not have had time, as, upon taking my seat in the 
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omnibus , X went on with a conversation already commenced, 
BUT I FELT A PERFECT CERTAINTY, (Henri Poincare) 
One phenomenon is certain and I can vouch for its 
absolute certainty: the sudden and immediate appearance 
of a solution at the very moment of sudden awakening. On 
being very abruptly awakened by an external noise, a 
solution long searched for appeared to me at once without 
the slightest instant of reflection on my part - the fact 
was remarkable enough to have struck me unforgettably - and 
in a quite different direction from any of those which I 
had previously tried to follow. (Jacques Hadamard) 
On April 27, 1802, I gave a shout of joy...It was seven 
years ago I proposed to myself a problem which I have not 
been able to solve directly, but for which I had found by 
chance a solution, and knew that it wcs correct, without 
being able to prove it. The matter often returned to my mind 
and I had sought twenty times unsuccessfully for this 
solution. For some days I had carried the idea about with 
me continually. At last, I DO NOT KNOW HOW, I found it... 
(Andre Marie Ampere) 
At last two days ago I succeeded, not by dint of pain¬ 
ful effort but so to speak by the grace of God. As a 
sudden flash of light, the enigma was solved.... For my part 
I am unable to name the nature of the thread which connected 
what I previously knew with that which made my success 
possible. (Karl Friedrich Gauss) 
I took part in the wine harvest. I watched the wine 
flowing, and going back from the effect to the cause, I 
studied the power of this press which nothing can resist.... 
A simple substitution which is a ray of light,...To work 
then'. God has revealed to me the secret that I demanded of 
Him..,. (Johannes Guttenberg) 
It is in the highest degree astonishing to see what a 
large number of general theorems, the methodical deduction 
of which requires the highest powers of mathematical analysis, 
he (Faraday) found by a kind of intuition, with the security 
of instinct, without the help of a single mathematical formula, 
(von Helmholtz) 
The words or the language, as they are written or 
spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism of 
thought. The physical entities which seem to serve as elements 
in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images 
which can be ’voluntarily’ reproduced and combined..,, 
Taken from a psychological viewpoint, this combinatory plau 
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seems to be the essential feature in productive thought - 
before there is any connection with logical construction in 
words or other kinds of signs which can be communicated to 
others. (Albert Einstein) 
'I see everywhere in the world the inevitable expression 
of the concept of infinity. It establishes in the depths 
of our hearts a belief in the supematureal. The idea of God 
is nothing more than one form of the idea of infinity. So 
long as the mystery of the infinite weighs on the human mind, 
so long will temples be raised to the cult of the infinite, 
whether God be called Brahmah, Allah, Jehovah or Jesus.,,The 
Greeks understood the mysterious power of the hidden side of 
things. They bequeathed to us one of the most beautiful words 
in our language—the word ’enthusiasm’—en the os—a god within. 
The grandeur of human actions is measured by the inspiration 
from which they spring. Happy is he who bears a god within— 
an ideal of beauty and who obeys it, an ideal of art, of 
science. All are lighted by reflection from the infinite.’ 
(Louis Pasteur) 
...I maintain that cosmic religiousness is the strongest 
and most noble driving force of scientific research. Only 
the man who can conceive the gigantic effort and above all 
the devotion, without which original scientific thought cannot 
succeed, can measure the strength of the feeling from which 
alone such work... can grow. What a deep belief in the 
intelligence of creation and what longing for understanding, 
even if only a meagre reflection in the revealed intelligence 
of this world, must have flourished in Kepler and Newton, 
enabling them as lonely men to unravel over years of work the 
mechanism of celestial mechanics .... Only the man who devotes 
his life to such goals has a living conception of what inspired 
these men and gave them strength to remain steadfast in their 
aims in spite of countless failures. It is cosmic religious¬ 
ness that bestows such strength. A contemporary has said, not 
unrightly, that the serious research scholar in our generally 
materialistic age is the only deeply religious human being. 
(Albert Einstein) 
I must, before I die, find some means of saying the 
essential thing which is in me, which I have not yet said, a 
thing which is neither love nor hate nor pity nor scorn but 
the very breath of life, shining and coming from afar, which 
will link into human life the immensity, the frightening, 
wondrous and implacable forces of the non-human, (Bertrand 
Russell) 
The most beautiful and most profound emotion we can 
experience is the sensation of the mystical. It is the sower 
of all true science. He to whom this emotion is a stranger, 
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who can no longer stand rapt in awe, is as good as dead. That 
deeply emotional conviction of the presence of a superior 
reasoning power, which is revealed in the incomprehensible 
universe, forms my idea of God. (Albert Einstein) 
Tue sublimation of the self-transcending emotions has 
transformed 'magic* into 'science'; but there is no hard- 
and-fast boundary between the two, Unconscious, pre-rational, 
®agical thinking enters both into the creative act and into 
the beliefs or superstitions of the scientist. .. .Not only 
Kepler's astronomy was derived from belief in the Holy Trinity 
and the Harmony of the Spheres; most of the giants of science 
were similarly inspired by religious, mystical or transcendental 
beliefs, (Arthur Koestler) 
I could go on and on with such anecdotes and descriptions, but 
the point should have been made. The crucial incidents in science are 
acts of knowledge, self-transcending experiences, acts of "living in." 
The verbalizations are, at best, secondary. Personal commitment, 
emotional attachment, and irrationality are the cornerstones of 
science as they are of all significant human endeavour. Indeed, I 
should note that Arthur Koestler in his brilliant THE ACT OF CREATION, 
has done an excellent job of documenting and explaining such notions 
for the fields of humor, the arts, and science. The creative act is 
the act of transcending one’s self, of discarding old category schemes, 
of combining frames of reference (Koestler calls them 'matrices') 
into wholes that were previously separated artificially, Science, 
like all other areas of human life, is a perfectly adequate means for 
living in, but its value lies in personal commitment and transcendence, 
not in its systematic verbalization. 
CHAPTER IV 
Psychology first lost its soul, then its mind, then 
consciousness ; but strangely enough, it still behaves! 
In the previous chapter I have tried to persuade the reader that 
science ultimately rests on the personal commitment of scientists to 
their theories, biases, and perspectives. A large number of current 
scientists and philosophers of science, especially in the more "exact" 
sciences like quantum mechanics and high energy physics, would concur 
with some such description. They would agree that theories are creat¬ 
ed, not found. That man imposes order on the universe with varying 
degrees of satisfaction. That Scientific Laws do not spring forth full 
blown from the head of Data, That the essence of science and its 
value to both individual scientists and the world does not lie in its 
systematic massing of reams of facts. 
But the so-called "Social Sciences", and psychology in particular, 
still gain their philosophical nourishment from philosophies of science 
which prevailed in physics at least 50 years ago, and have since long 
died their natural deaths. The modern day psychologist, by and large, 
perceives his science in the kind of naive realistic manner that the 
natural scientist has long since abandoned as hopeless, Consider, for 
example, the following quotations from B,F, Skinner’s SCIENCE AND 
HUMAN BEHAVIOR: 
Science is more than the mere description of events as 
they occur, It is an attempt to discover order, to show 
that certain eyents stand in lawful relations to other 
events. (p.6) 
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Science is first of all a set of attitudes. It is a 
disposition to deal with the facts rather than with what 
someone has said about them. ... Science is a willingness to 
accept facts even when they are opposed to wishes. Thought¬ 
ful men have perhaps always known that we are likely to see 
things as we want to see them instead of as they are, but 
thanks to Sigmund Freud we are today much more clearly aware 
of 'wishful thinking.' The opposite of wishful thinking is 
intellectual honesty - an extremely important possession of 
the successful scientist. (p.12) 
Science is, of course, more than a set of attitudes. 
It is a search for order, for uniformities, for lawful rela¬ 
tions among the events in nature. (p.13) 
The notion of science implied by the above quotations, and all 
the more so by the major thrust of Behaviorism, is one which derives 
quite directly from Percy W. Bridgman's "operationism, In reaction 
to the revolution which Einstein initiated in modern physics, and in 
accord with the more general outlook of the logical positivists 
(especially Ayer'* and Carnap^) Bridgman proposed a naively realistic 
philosophy of science which he believed would forever protect Science 
from Einsteinian catastrophe's. The essence of operationism was that 
all concepts mean no more than their strictly empirical descriptions: 
In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a 
set of operations.... if we have more than one set of operations, 
we have more than one concept. 
Operationism in the "hard" sciences died almost at the instant 
that it was born with scientists in a variety of fields stressing what 
Bridgman ignored - the total dependence of operations and concepts on 
theory. As Einstein wrote, in reply to Bridgman: 
In order to be able to consider a logical system as physical 
theory it is not necessary to demand that all its assertions 
be independently interpreted and 'tested' 'operationally ; 
de facto this has never yet been achieved by any theory and can¬ 
not at all be achieved. 
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Why were the natural sciences so quick to reject operationism? 
-Because it is self—contradictory and, equally important (as Einstein 
reflects above) a naively inaccurate view of what scientists have 
done. Consider, for a moment, an operational approach to the concept 
"length." 
How would we go about measuring a length, even approximate¬ 
ly? We would take a yardstick and put it down next to the 
object measured, and see how many times we can lay it end to 
end - forgetting for the moment about fractions of yards. But 
which yardstick? There is an official meterstick in Paris, 
but it is very precious , and never used. What we do is 
measure off another stick of the same length, and use it. But 
how do we know that this will give us the same answer? How do 
we know that it makes no difference what material it is made 
of and by what route it is carried to the object to be measured? 
The answer is that we consult our theories to see whether 
these factors influence the length; we are told that the route 
traveled makes no difference, but the material it is made of 
may influence the measurement, for example, in very hot 
weather. But this is a vicious circle! We are trying to define 
length; in applying this definition we must apply theories 
which make use of the concept of length, which is yet to be 
defined. How do we know what the theories mean until we know 
what length is ,^and how do we know what length is until we have 
these theories? 
To put the argument in Polanyi’s terms, we need a subsidiary 
awareness of a whole body of theory in order to define length. And 
we need a subsidiary awareness of length in order to build bodies of 
theory which employ that concept. Operationism denied the intuition 
and commitment to theory upon which science rests, and so was rejected 
in short order. 
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But the behavioral sciences (with Watson taking the initiative) 
swallowed Bridgman hook, line, and sinker. Rejecting the much more 
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sophisticated views toward science of psychologists like Freud (,a 
keenly astutue philosopher of science), the behaviorist tradition 
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gained its major foundations from a still-born philosophy of science. 
The rebirth of behaviorism with its empirical, approach to human life; 
search for the laws governing human behavior; with its 
insistence upon behavioral definitions for such concepts as "mind" 
and emotion ; and with its rejection of any meaning in such concepts 
unless they can be defined behaviorally amounts to little more than 
an attempt to revive a fictitious past, If psychology is a science, 
or is ever to become one, it will find its grounding in the same 
elements of intuition, commitment to theory, and subsidiary awareness 
that support other scientific endeavours. 
The irony of the situation is that, although behaviorism presumes 
to be purely atheoretical, empirical, and "objective" it is, by 
human necessity, bound up in the same processes of theory-building, 
bias, and commitment that it renounces in other breeds of psychology. 
After all, how does one know what a "behavior" is except by some body 
of theory or conceptual structure which gives that category meaning? 
As I have argued- elsewhere, the mere use of language constitutes a 
commitment to ways of dividing the world which are arbitrary but 
which guide our very thoughts and actions. The only psychology that 
could ever be free of theory, bias, and commitment would be the 
totally silent psychology, and behaviorism is certainly not that! 
Kekule’s recommendation is one which psychologists would do well 
to consider: 
;— -"Let us learn~to dream, gentlemen!" 
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The psychological theories described in the following chapters 
are verbalizations of dreams, They represent the kind of speculation 
and commitment which must ultimately become the basis of psychology in 
any humanly scientific form. Furthermore, they represent beginning 
points for accomplishing a major task which all psychologies must 
heed, but which few even recognize as a problem: Psychology, as a 
science, must be grounded in some substantial body of philosophy. 
But psychology deals with human beings, and human beings are the 
producers of both philosophy and psychology. Thus, psychological 
theory must account for itself and for the philosophy on which it is 
based. 
The physicist can be content to ground his theories in contem¬ 
porary philosophies of science and then proceed to follow his 
intuition as it leads him with no need to introspect on how that 
theory applies to itself, to himself, or to the philosophy on which it 
is based. But the psychologist's theories must do more. They must 
help in explaining the psychologist to himself. They must be of use 
in explaining how they, themselves, arose. And they must simultane¬ 
ously support and be supported by a philosophy of science, To use 
Polanyi’s framework again, an adequate phychological theory must rely 
on subsidiary awareness as support for its focal awareness, but it 
must also be able to account for that which it relies on and must even 
account for the subsidiary-focal relationship, 
No small task, that, but it is precisely the direction in which 
the theories to be described attempt to move. They begin by assuming 
the philosophical bases which have already been discussed: science 
as commitment, intuition, subsidiary awareness, living-in, The theo¬ 
ries are based on the legitimacy of personally held theory — they 
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derive their ultimate validity from my commitment to them, and from 
that of those others who share that commitment. At the same time, 
the theories help to explain the manners in which we slice up the 
world arbitrarily; the ways in which focal awareness becomes sub¬ 
sidiary awareness; the ways in which living in is possible as a human 
experience and the necessity for human beings (including me as 
psychological theorist) to rely on committed-to words and theories in 
their attempts to categorize the uncategorized. 
Some more words about words seems necessary at this point. The 
philosophy of science I have described and the psychological theories 
I will describe are all founded in language, conceptual schemes, the 
slicing up of the "world-hologram," Yet, I am committed to that 
philosophy and those theories in the same manner as I am committed to 
the notion of an unverbalizeable world, Contradiction? Perhaps, but 
if so it is to be expected in a world which language can only describe 
arbitrarily. The theories which I propose are arbitrary and decep¬ 
tive as are all verbalizations. They do, however, carry my personal 
conviction, plus confirmation through evidence which I will describe, 
plus the personal convictions of several noted psychologists. And, 
most importantly, they succeed in doing what few psychologies have 
attempted - explaining themselves. 
Lest the reader get lost in the technicalities which follow, let 
me describe the general structure of the subsequent chapters. Chapter 
—y proposes a theory of schizophrenia and attempts to explain thereby 
how mystical experiences and extreme cases of "living in" are possible. 
Chapter VI deals with some general and specific considerations . 
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of human processing of sensory input. The intent here is to document 
the notion that human beings impose order upon the universe, even at 
such basic and primitive levels as visual perception. Chapter VII 
builds on the specifics of Chapter VI and begins to set forth a 
general model of "learning", where I mean by learning the development 
of systematic ways of categorizing, slicing-up the world. By the time 
he reaches Chapter VIII, the reader will find himself out of the trees 
and ready to see the forest, for it is at that point that I shall 
begin to tie both philosophical and psychological considerations 
explicitly to the main focus of this document: student-directed 
learning. 
CHAPTER V 
I want you to remember that in the present state of our 
society, the patient is right, and you are wrong, 
The descriptions of the schizophrenic experience already mention¬ 
ed in Chapter I, and the central place which such mystical experiences 
have in that chapter, make the psychology of schizophrenia an excellent 
jumping-off place. Most of the elements of the general learning 
theory to be described in Chapter VII will appear somewhere in this 
chapter. But my intent here is not to develop the learning theory. 
Rather, it is to convince the reader that a substantial body of 
^psychology and physiology can be brought behind H.S, Sullivan’s state¬ 
ment above. In the terms that I used in Chapter I, the schizophrenic 
experience is one of "living in", of feeling the world in its "real", 
undifferentiated state. This chapter attempts to explain how it is 
that such living in experiences can occur, and how it is that they 
frequently lead their experiencers to become what we classify as 
s chizoph renic. 
The label "schizophrenic” is usually applied in the following 
four categories to people who exhibit the associated behavior 
patterns: 
CL) Simple Schizophrenic: Usually develops in the early 
teens and is typified by extreme 
_apathy to the environment. 
(2) Hebephrenic: Also develops early and slowly. _The ^ 
person exhibits very active but "absurd 
behavior - unexplained laughing, 
48 
bizarre word associations, degenerate 
behavior (e.g, eating dirt). 
(3) Paranoid. Onset is usually quite sudden in early to 
middle adulthood. The patient has 
delusions - systematized beliefs about 
the world not shared by the rest of 
humanity - and hallucinations, 
(4) Catatonic: Onset is usually quite sudden. The patient 
is seemingly unresponsive to the world 
and displays unusual outbursts of behavior 
(e.g, attacks or assaults, or very rigid 
walking, curling up in a ball, etc,) 
Needless to say, the kinds of behavior that will suffice to get a 
person labeled as officially schizophrenic differ quite widely from 
one another. The important question in all such cases is that of 
deciding between what is the Primary disorder, and what is Secondary. 
Is the paranoid's systematic delusion an adaptive response to some 
other problem, or is the delusion at the core of the problem itself 
If a person limps when he has a broken leg, we quite easily classify 
the limp as a secondary disorder - an adaptive and sensible response 
to the primary disorder, a broken, leg, If a person is subject to 
frequent catatonic fits, are the fits secondary or primary disorders? 
If secondary, then what are the fits a response to? 
In a nutshell, the theory of schizophrenia which I wish to pro¬ 
pose sees all of the symptoms described above as secondary, adaptive 
reactions to a much more basic "problem". The schizophrenic is the 
person who, for one reason or another, has mo re accurate perceptions 
of the "real" world than the rest of us. Perception of the world, as 
we "normal" people engage in it, is a complex interaction between input 
from the world and our own perceptual modification of that input, The 
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schizophrenic is one who is not able to modify the input as 
extensively as we do, and hence he experiences, things in ways closer 
to reality than we do. The symptoms of schizophrenia are simply 
adaptations which the schizophrenic makes in order to cope with his 
more intense perceptions, and with the fact that no one besides him¬ 
self seems to be experiencing those perceptions. Most of the psycho¬ 
logy which I will explain in this and subsequent chapters is an 
attempt to understand what it is that we do to "reality" as it enters 
our perceptors that schizophrenics do not do. 
Perhaps a good start would be for us to consider what it means 
to "pay attention" to something. What we are doing when, in a crowded, 
noisy room, we focus our attention on one particular voice? The most 
likely answer is that we are tuning everything else besides that one 
voice out. We pay attention to the voice by ignoring everything be¬ 
sides the voice. To a large extent, focusing attention is a negative, 
-rather than a positive, matter. There is abundant psychological 
evidence for such -a conception of attention, most of it stemming from 
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the work of people like Moruzzi and French on the "reticular form- 
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ation" (about which more later), Malmo on activation, and the classi¬ 
cal learning theorists (e.g. Hull)"* on inhibition. 
Most interestingly, some of the physiological mechanisms of this 
process of attention through selection have been worked out, and they 
bear directlv on the problems of schizophrenics. What seems to happen 
- -is that the reticular formation "(a structure Tn the mid-brain) serves 
the double role of activating the cortex as a whole (i.e. tuning it up, 
preparing it to receive stimuli) and at the same time damping down all 
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inputs except the ones to which a person is attending. It is this 
latter function of inhibitting incoming stimuli that is of most 
interest for our purposes. The nerve mechanisms whereby this kind of 
inhibition occurs have also been studied to some extent, and also 
provide some helpful clues to the world of the schizophrenic. Most of 
the nerve fibers which inhibit input are '’cholinergic" - a particular 
class of autonomic nerves which gets its name from one of the chemicals 
involved in the transmission of nerve impulses from one nerve to 
another. When a cholinergic nerve "fires", the impulse is in part 
transmitted by the chemical acetylcholine, secreted well in excess of 
what is necessary to trigger the next nerve in line. But once the 
nerve has fired, two other chemicals are released (cholinesterase and 
serotonin) to absorb the extra acetylcholine and thus return the first 
nerve to normalcy. If the cholinesterase and serotonin were not there, 
the cholinergic nerves would have a much lower threshhold than they 
usually do - i,e. they would fire with much less prodding. If an 
excess of either'cholinesterase or serotonin exists, the nerves will 
have a much higher threshhold - i.e. it will take much more prodding 
to fire them. 
Now, what seems to be happening in "normal" human beings is that 
a certain range of incoming stimuli from the world is sufficiently 
strong to register with our sense organs, but not sufficiently strong 
to activate the cholinergic-inhibitory system. These are the stimuli 
that we are paying attention to at any given point in time, But, at 
the same time, in most human beings the threshhold of the nerves in 
the inhibitory system of the reticular formation is sufficiently low 
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(i.e. we have little enough cholinesterase and serotonin) that we 
are able to block out a good deal of the incoming world. Our screen¬ 
ing system, if you will, is sufficiently sensitive to prevent a large 
part of the world from even registering our attentions, thus enabling 
us to deal with the world systematically, a piece at a time, What, 
then, given this maze of chemicals and nerve systems involved in 
attention through selection, might be different about the schizophren¬ 
ic? The strongest possibility, backed by several lines of research, 
seems to be that the schizophrenic is troubled by an abnormality in 
his use or production of serotonin. In particular, the schizophrenic 
in early stages seems to have a relative abundance of serotonin at 
his cholinergic nerve seems to have a relative abundance of serotonin 
at his cholinergic nerve sites, hence the threshhold of his inhibition 
system is high, hence he is relatively incapable of screening out 
sensory inputs from the world. 
The evidence for this fairly specific hypothesis comes from all 
sorts of scattered places and levels, and it would take volumes to 
reproduce it all here, but some of it can be stated at least in general 
terms. Several physiologists have attempted to make assays of the 
relative amounts of serotonin in normal people as compared with 
schizophrenics (a mightily difficult procedure). Though this work is 
far from conclusive due to its complexity, the evidence of such re¬ 
searchers as Toderick, Wooley-Shaw, and Marazzi would suggest that 
schizophrenics may, in fact, have an excess of serotonin at their 
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cholinergic nerve sites. 
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Another block of evidence for the hypothesis comes from the 
extensive psychological and physiological work which has been per¬ 
formed using LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide). Psychologically, LSD 
produces perceptions and behaviors which are very closely parallel to 
schizophrenia. In particular, the hallucinations, the feelings of 
being bombarded by extra-intense sensory input which is not systemat¬ 
ized and controlled as it normally is, and even the strange behavior 
patterns are closely parallel to those of schizophrenics in the early 
stages of the ’’disease,” Physiologically, the effects of LSD, though 
still subject to much conjecture, may be even more relevant. The 
best current guess (again based on the work of people like Wooley-Shaw, 
Zeller, and Ditman) is that LSD performs the same function at 
cholinergic nerve sites as serotonin - i.e, it absorbs excess 
acetylcholine, thereby raising the threshhold of cholinergic nerves 
and interfering with a person's ability to screen out sensory inputs, 
LSD, by blocking the activity of cholinergic nerves, by preventing a 
person from screening out sensory inputs that he "normally” screens 
out, produces many of the characteristics of acute schizophrenia,7 
The third block of evidence comes from a wide variety of sources 
focused on the process of learning, reinforcement, and inhibition, 
particularly as those processes are related to the reticular formation 
of the brain. The evidence here is far more extensive and complicated 
than in other areas, but is basically just an extension of the notion 
of attention as inhibition of the unwanted, Beginning with learning 
theories like that of Hull and with investigations of arousal and 
activation, one can build an argument about learning as a process of 
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inhibittmg 'incorrect” responses, just as we are looking at attention 
as inhibition of unwanted stimuli. With learning viewed in this 
light, we would predict that a schizophrenic, or a normal person or 
animal whose cholinergic activity has been blocked by administration 
of a drug, would have greater difficulty in simple learning experi¬ 
ments than a normal” person. With his cholinergic activity blocked, 
the person would be unable to inhibit incorrect responses and would 
tend to continue making errors because he was not able to block them. 
Evidence that such is, in fact, the case has been obtained by Hearst, 
Carleton, Krech and Rosenzweig in studies of the tffects of drugs and 
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cholinergic activity upon animal learning and by people like Howe, 
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Venables, and Wing in studies of schizophrenics. 
Before summarizing all of these disparate findings into a total 
picture of the schizophrenic experience, I must turn to one other 
aspect of the whole problem. In addition to the four classifications 
of a schizophrenic behavior described at the beginning of this chapter, 
there is a fundamental distinction between "acute” and "chronic” 
schizophrenics. The acute schizophrenic is the patient in the early 
stages of the "disease", whose perceptions and behavior have become 
strange, and who may therefore have been committed to an institution. 
The chronic schizophrenic is the patient who has spent many years in 
an institution and whose behavior has long since settled into some 
unusual rut - usually characterized by extreme inactivity and unrespon¬ 
siveness. Acute schizophrenics who are committed to institutions 
frequently (though not always) become chronic as the years go by. 
Some acute schizophrenics (about 20 per cent - a figure which has_ not 
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changed since about 1920, despite all the varied efforts to design 
treatments and therapies) return to normalcy at some point, All 
chronic schizophrenics were at some point in the early stages of the 
"disease" in the acute stage. 
The distinction between acute and chronic has considerably more 
significance for the theory of schizophrenia that I am proposing than 
do the four categories mentioned earlier, The four categories 
represent, to me, different behavior patterns which schizophrenics 
adopt in order to live with and explain to themselves their unusual 
perceptions. The acute-chronic distinction, however, has a fairly 
substantial physiological meaning. The acute schizophrenic is the one 
who is bombarded by sensory input because his screening mechanisms 
are not functioning — i,e, his cholinergic nerve activity is hampered. 
This means two things in the light of the double function of the 
reticular system: (1) the acute schizophrenic does not screen inputs 
very effectively and is hence bombarded by his environment; (2) the 
acute schizophrenic is at a relatively low level of arousal or 
activation due to a low level of reticular stimulation of the cortex 
in general. 
The chronic schizophrenic, on the other hand, is physiologically 
quite the opposite. His level of arousal and activation is abnormally 
-high and his screening activity is exceptionally effective, Thus, 
whereas the acute schizophrenic does not screen out as much input as 
we do, the chronic screens out far more than we do. These extreme 
differences in the physiology of acutes and chronics have been fairly 
well documented by such researchers as Shagass and Hall, and are. 
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exceptionally well illustrated by the different reactions of acutes 
and chronics to administration of small doses of tranquilizers. If 
such drugs are administered to acute schizophrenics, their symptoms 
and abnormalities are greatly worsened, But if administered to 
chronic schizophrenics, even though they are outwardly very passive, 
the tranquilizers lead to some improvement and lessening of 
abnormalities. 
What seems to be happening when tranquilizers are given to the 
two groups? When administered to acutes, the drugs increase the 
problem by lowering an already low level of arousal and by further 
hampering the patient’s ability to screen out environmental input, 
But when given to chronics, the drugs lower a level of arousal which 
is too high, and prevent the patient from screening out as much as he 
does, thus bringing him closer to the levels of arousal and "screening" 
that we typically are at. 
The general picture of schizophrenia which emerges from the 
preceding discussion is somewhat as follows. For reasons yet to be 
determined, some people develop a physiological problem involving 
their use or production of serotonin. This problem results in their 
being at relatively low levels of arousal (and hence, easily aroused) 
and makes them unable to screen out the sensory inputs which they have 
been screening out all their lives. They begin to experience sensa¬ 
tions which the people around them are not experiencing (see THE INNER 
WORLD OF MENTAL ILLNESS) - brighter colors, louder sounds, generally 
unsystematized and uncategorized perceptions. Since no one else is 
having these experiences, and since they, themselves, have never had 
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them before, they b,egin to develop rationalizations of their new 
sensations and behavior patterns that will help them cope with them. 
They might believe that they are being persecuted by "someone" or 
everyone, or that they have been singled out as special by God 
(Paranoid) ... They might find the sensations too much to bear and 
consciously tune out their environment through extreme apathy 
(simple). They might simply "flow" with their new sensations and thus 
exhibit behavior which is strange to the rest of us - e.g. laughing 
for no good (to us) reason, strange word associations (hebephrenic). 
They might exhibit extremely violent bursts of behavior due to their 
excitability or might adopt a rigid posture, including very slow walk¬ 
ing, in order to prevent their kaleidoscopic sensations from becoming 
overwhelming by their changing so quickly (catatonic). 
In any case, the behaviors which we focus on to categorize them 
as "sick" are quite natural reactions to a rather drastic change in 
their perceptual world. They feel like they are "made of hollow glass" 
because of their extremely intense sensory experiences, and they cope 
with those experiences in ways that we find to be unusual. So we 
commit them to an institution which by virtue of its being intensely 
stimulus free, helps them to shift from the acute stage to the chronic 
stage. Thus, with sensations coming in at a rapid and uncontrolled 
rate, they adopt the defense of trying to shut out as much of the 
incoming world as they possibly can so that they can cope with their 
world. And we help them shut the world out by placing them in 
institutions that do a let of the shutting out for them (e.g. plain 
white rooms). Slowly, the acutes become chronic as their state of 
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arousal increases and they are able to shut out more and more of the 
external world. Finally, they and we, have succeeded in shutting out 
so much that they are faced with a new problem, in a new inner world, 
that they are rarely, if ever, able to escape from — hallucinations. 
Whereas the acute schizophrenic is placed in the difficult 
position of dealing with genuine, but very new and intense, sensations, 
the chronic schizophrenic is faced with a world of hallucinations that 
are quite literally produced from within. The hallucinatory world of 
the chronic is undoubtedly quite similar to (and arises for the same 
reasons as) the well-documented hallucinatory world of people 
participating in sensory deprivation experiments,^^ In conditions 
where sensory input is severely limited, human beings seem to fill 
their minds with assortments of material stored over the years in 
their brains. Thus, the sleeping person dreams; the person in a 
sensory deprivation chamber hallucinates; and the chronic schizophrenic 
is confined (by himself and a mental institution) to a hallucinatory 
world. 
This description of schizophrenia bears quite directly on much of 
the philosophy which I have already propounded and on much of the 
psychology which is soon to be discussed, I am claiming that, just as 
the descriptions of schizophrenic experience may describe the world in 
a more "real" manner that our schematized descriptions, so there is a 
sizeable body of psychological evidence which helps account for the 
difference between' normal and schizophrenic perceptions. In particular, 
the evidence does indicate that the acute schizophrenic’s perceptions 
are more real than ours in the sense that they are more complete., less 
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actively screened and modified by the perceiver. It is only through 
our labeling of the schizophrenic as mentally "sick", and through 
the schizophrenic’s own sense of strangeness, inadequacy, and disease, 
that the acute, who lives in the world more fully than we, comes to 
defend himself by closing out the world and creating his own 
hallucinatory version of reality - i.e, becomes a chronic schizophrenic, 
usually for the rest of his life. 
Furthermore, we have begun to discuss the ways in which we, 
by contrast with the acute schizophrenic, process and screen the infor¬ 
mation which comes to our senses from the world. We have, thus far, 
looked briefly at one of the mechanisms (the reticular formation) 
whereby we actively block out sensory input and prevent it from 
registering on our minds. It is to a more detailed consideration of 
these processes of sensory control, modification, and screening that I 
wish now to turn. The schizophrenic, as I have described him, is the 
person who is particularly able to head Camus' dictum: 
Open yourself to the benign indifference of the universe 
Let us inspect the ways in which we close ourselves, keep the 
world out, and fail to "live in", 
CHAPTER VI 
-Seeing is believing Believing is seeing 
tfost of us regard the eye as one of the most passive receptors 
which we possess. To be sure, we are aware that the eye does not pick 
up all the frequencies of light that surround us, but we tend to 
believe that what our eyes do see arrives at our brains in fairly 
undistorted fashion, We consider the eye to be a window to the world, 
letting what is out there come in so that we may behold it. 
Until recently, psychology has, in fact, regarded virtually all 
sensory perception in some such light. The old theories of the 
"reflex arc" and of stimulus-response psychology in general were pre¬ 
dicated on the belief that the nervous system (excluding the brain) 
serves two separate functions: letting pure information in, and 
activating muscles. Until recently, the afferent (carrying messages to 
the brain) and efferent (carrying messages from the brain) nervous 
systems were thought to be quite separate except for their connections 
at the brain and spinal column. 
Recent work in neurophysiology has pretty much destroyed these 
notions. Experiments involving virtually every mode of sense perception 
have demonstrated that the afferent—efferent distinction is not as 
clean as we liked to believe. What has been found, in general, is that 
some 10-30 per cent of our afferent nerve fibers carry messages _to the 
sense organs, thereby exerting active control over what is perceived 
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and how it is perceived. General statements of and evidence regarding 
this view can be found in the work of such people as Kuffler, Hunt,1 
Hagbarth, Kerr, Galambos, Pribram, Spinelli, Sperry,5 and Weiss.6 
I wish, in this chapter, to deal with the more specific problem of 
afferent control of perception in the eye as a model of such control 
3.11 other perceptors and as a model of the process of learning (see 
Chapter VII), The eye is, after all, an ideal case for study since 
the retina is little more than a group of migrated brain cells: in this 
sense, at least, the eye is_ a window to the brain. 
First, a few words must be said about the structure of the retina. 
Rather than being a single layer of rods and cones which are sensitive 
to light, the retina consists of at least four layers of nerve cells, 
the last of which (i,e, farthest from the entering light) is made up of 
the light-sensitive rods and cones. The other three layers (amacrines, 
bipolars, and ganglion cells) are highly relevant to the following 
discussions for they appear to be the ones that play an active part in 
interpreting, coding, and distorting information before it is passed on 
to the brain, ^ The messages that are sent from the eye to the brain are 
not "pure" reflections from light sensitive cells, but interpreted, 
coded versions of that input. 
One of the ways in which the retinal cells code visual information 
is through what is known as '’lateral inhibition" - probably a function 
of the amacrine cells. The physiological and behavioral aspects of 
lateral inhibition have been investigated fairly thoroughly for the 
8 
senses of sight, hearing, and touch by such researchers as Hartlme, 
Hubei,9 Ratleff,10 and Eccles.11 In the case of the eye, what seems to 
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happen is that the activity of a rod or cone inhibits the activity of 
its neighbors. Thus, when a receptor fires due to light shining on 
it depresses the firing of its neighbors. The stronger the light, 
and the closer the neighbor, the stronger the effect of the inhibition. 
Ihis effect of each rod and cone on its neighbors seems to be achieved 
through the amacrine cells which laterally connect the receptors with 
one another. 
The effects of lateral inhibition on information coming into the 
eye are crucial both to our ability to perceive and to my discussion. 
The mutual inhibition of neighbor by neighbor serves to increase the 
amount of contrast in the visual material entering the eye. And a 
striking example of the way in which contrast is increased by lateral 
inhibition is found in the phenomenon called "Mach Bands" named after 
12 
the physicist Ernst Mach who first investigated them extensively, 
If a human being looks at a piece of paper which is graded smoothly and 
13 
continuously from light to dark, he will not see the gradation as 
perfectly continuous. Rather, he will see a light band in the light 
area and a dark band in the dark area so that the change in darkness 
" " appears to be "bumpy" rather than smooth. These light and dark bands, 
which are produced by the observer's eye through lateral inhibition, 
are Mach Bands. It is literally impossible for a human being not to 
see Mach Bands, and yet they are not "really" there - they are produced 
by the retina. Furthermore, it is the same mechanism which produces 
Mach Bands that enables us to perceive contrast at all. Were it not 
for lateral inhibition we would not be able to perceive the contrasts 
(bright-dark, loud-soft, hard-soft) that we "find" in the outside world 
62 
In addition to lateral inhibition which helps us perceive contrast, 
there are other things going on in the retina which also alter the 
visual information coming in from the outside. One of these phenomena 
is known as adaptation or "self-inhibition" and is typified by the 
obvious processes of "getting used to" a dark room or colored sun 
glasses. Until very recently it was thought that adaptation was 
merely related to bleaching of pigments in the rods and cones 
(receptors) of the retina. But recent work involving Electro-Retino- 
grams, and an interesting experiment by Ratleff indicate that such is 
not the case. Ratleff*s experiments involved the production of a 
stabilized image on the subject's retina through the use of mirrors 
(including one mounted on the white part of the eye) and an electronic 
1A device which corrects for eye movements. The apparatus causes a slit 
of light to be shined into the eye such that it continues to fall on 
the same receptors, regardless of the person's eye movements. With the 
light always falling on the same rods and cones, it is perceived ac¬ 
curately for a few seconds, but then it disappears. After a few 
seconds, the person no longer sees the light at all. 
What seems to happen is that the bipolar cells of the retina act 
as a feedback loop and if the light on a given receptor cell is not 
changing, it is erased within a few seconds. This phenomenon of self-1 
inhibition" is, once again, not isolated to the sense of sight. If, 
for example, the reader will place the eraser of a pencil on the back 
of his hand and hold it perfectly still, he will find that after a few 
i 
seconds he can no longer feel its presence. The sense receptors respond 
to the change (a new light or a pencil on the back of the hand) but 
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then, unless things change again, they erase themselves and are thus 
prepared for whatever else might come their way. 
Let us stop here and build a somewhat abstract model of perception 
which builds on and extrapolates these notions of lateral and self 
inhibition. Sensory information from "outside" is coded into some sort 
of message through the process of lateral inhibition. The information 
is , in a sense, stereotyped by this process - contrasts are exaggerated 
and "distinguishing" features are highlighted so that the input may be 
coded (categorized) and passed along the line. The receptor is then 
erased by the process of. self-inhibition so that it is ready to process 
the next input that comes along. As we proceed up the neural hierarchy, 
these same two processes continue to operate, all the way up to the 
cortex. That is, each stage adds further coding, categorizing, and 
processing and then erases itself to await new input. Further evidence 
seems to indicate that the ways in which the incoming information is 
coded depends on a whole life-time of active experiences, and it is to 
this evidence that I now wish to turn. 
The evidence begins with a simple experiment first described by 
“Helmholtz which the reader could perform on himself. Close one eye, 
and then with your fingers push the other eye around. What you will 
see is that the whole perceptual field seems to bounce around - i.e. to 
move in the direction that you move your eyeball. But if you were to 
move your eyh in the same way with your eye muscles (rather than your 
finger) the world'would not appear to be moving. And yet the pattern 
of light which falls on the retina in the two cases is exactly the same 
The traditional explanation of this phenomenon is one that employs 
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an analogy and we shall start with it in the hopes that the analogy 
can be made a bit more concrete. Consider the eye as a projector and 
the retina (or, perhaps, the visual cortex) as a screen on which 
images can be shown. Normally, when we move our eyes with our eye 
muscles, we simultaneously "move" the screen so that the world does 
not appear to move. In the above experiment, the projector is moved, 
but the screen is not, hence the sensation of the world bouncing 
around. Landsteiner added a good deal of credence to this analogy by 
performing the converse experiment upon himself - moving the screen 
without moving the eye. He paralyzed (temporarily) his eye muscles 
and then tried to move his eyes. Obviously, his eyes did not move, 
but the world appeared to move around - i.e. he moved the screen with¬ 
out moving the projector. 
Further evidence indicates that, in order for a person to 
construct such a "screen" which moves in harmony with one's projector, 
one myst be active rather than merely passive in receiving stimuli. 
Several experiments have been performed wherein the subject wears 
prism glasses which flip his visual world upside down. If the subject 
is allowed to move around and be active, the world flips itself back to 
right-side-up within two weeks - i.e. the screen turns itself upside 
down to match the projector. Similarly, Richard Held has performed 
experiments on kittens wherein some of them walk under their own power 
and others are pulled in a gondola, but all are exposed for tue same 
length of time to the same visual patterns. The active cats learned to 
discriminate the patterns, the passive ones did not. 
Teuber, Pribram,15 and Bruner16 have referred to this process of 
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preparing the screen" as corollary discharge or, more popularly, a 
feed-forward-mechanism." The basic notion is that when we are about 
to perceive through a particular sensory mode, we pre-set the percep¬ 
tual process in anticipation of the perceptions. Our perceptions and 
actions then change the "screen" on which our next perceptions will 
be seen and we prepare the new screen for the next round of perceptions. 
Needless to say, this analogizing is somewhat speculative, but the 
experiments cited above plus some of the work of Pribram on the visual 
cortex of the monkey do suggest that some such feed-forward-mechanism, 
influenced by past actions, is crucial to the way in which we 
perceive."^ The juicy question is, of course, what is the "screen" on 
which our perceptions are seen and which is pre-set to accommodate all 
our incoming sensory data? 
For a possible answer let us return to my original description of 
holographic photography. The combination of a reference beam of light 
and light bouncing from objects produces interference patterns on a 
photographic plate. These interference patterns can then be illuminated 
so as to reproduce a three-dimensional picture of the object. The 
picture produced is the same regardless of how small or large a piece 
of the hologram is illuminated. Interestingly enough, there is mounting 
evidence that the sensory processes of the human being as I have been 
describing them in this chapter operate in much the same way as a 
hologram.^ 
Jacques Loeb and Lashley have suggested that interference patterns 
in the brain account for perceptions. Bearle, Gray Walter, and Lilley 
have produced evidence that interference patterns do exist and can be 
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shown by proper tapping of cortical activity. And Norton and Galambos 
have produced a piece of evidence which makes the hologram analogy seem 
well worth persuing: they have found that removal of up to 98 per cent 
of a cat’s optic nerve fibers does not interfere with the cat’s ability 
to perform at pattern discrimination tasks. 
With so much for accumulated bits and pieces of evidence, let me 
try to describe in broad outline the model of perception-screening that 
emerges from a consideration of the hologram analogy. At any particu¬ 
lar "level" of the perceptual process, from retina to visual cortex, 
the process of lateral inhibition serves to accentuate and abstract 
incoming information, coding it into a more "usuable" (and less accurate) 
form, then passing it on to the next level and wiping itself clean 
(self inhibition) to receive the next input. Furthermore, at each 
level of the process the incoming nerve impulses interact with the en¬ 
tire sum of spontaneous nerve activity that is already going on. Thus, 
the incoming data is comparable to the "object beam" in holography, and 
the existing neural activity is what we have called the "screen" - 
the "reference beam" in holography. Every perception, then, is an inter¬ 
ference pattern produced by the combination of large-scale neural "waves" 
from outside and inside. 
Thus, for example, at the retina, interference patterns are formed 
by the nerve activity stimulated by incoming light mixing with the 
’’reference beam” (i,e. the sum of perceptions stored up until that time). 
This interference pattern is passed on to the visual cortex thus chang¬ 
ing the screen (reference beam) and the retina is then prepared for new 
input (i.e. the new version of the screen, modified by the last per- 
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ception, is fed forward to serve as the reference beam for the next in¬ 
put), The "screen" we have been talking about is the "reference beam" 
and it is constantly being changed since it is no more than the "sum" 
of all the effects of neural interference patterns which a person 
has experienced. 
How is the "screen" stored? That is, how do the effects of all 
our perceptions come to have a more-or-less permanent effect on our 
mode of perception in the future? This is not the place to go into the 
physiology of memory (for the reader who is interested, D.P. Kimble’s 
THE ANATOMY OF MEMORY is an interesting start). But the recent work 
19 20 21 
of Hyden, Krech, Rosenzweig, Bennett, Diamond, and Pribram would 
suggest that the two factors of RNA-induced protein formation and 
actual growth of nerve fibers are involved in both rewiring and chang¬ 
ing the "resistance" of neural pathways. These two processes could 
account for changes in the entire cortical circuit being produced by 
new sensations (i.e. interference patterns) - and the changes in the 
circuit would, in effect, be what we call "memory". That is, each 
perception influences the ways in which future experiences will be had 
by changing the cortical circuit. The degree of permanence in that 
change is the degree of permanence of the memory of the perception. 
Pfy concern, however, is not closely related to memory and its 
physiology, a subject which has relevance in its own light. Whatever 
theory of memory turns out to be most popular, and however many stages 
it has between short-and long-term, it will, in my terms, be accounting 
for the way in which incoming perceptions influence future perceptions. 
I have tried, in this chapter, to show the many ways in which incoming 
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perceptions are modified by our past experiences, stored as they are in 
the neural patterns of our brains. Every experience we have is coded, 
even at such primitive levels as the retina. The information which 
reaches our "minds" is not "the same" as that which impinged on our 
eyeballs. It is abstracted, categorized and filtered in ways that 
we are never conscious of but which are part of our very physiology. 
Furthermore, every such categorized perception influences the 
way in which future perceptions will be categorized. By the time a 
person has reached my age (and, indeed, well before) he has, in 
effect, built into his head an entire world of categories and systems 
which filter, screen, and abstract his perceptions into familiar boxes. 
The perceptions "themselves" do not come wrapped tightly by Nature in 
such boxes, but we develop the boxes ourselves, in our heads. I have 
claimed that these filtering and screening mechanisms operate at all 
levels of the neural process, and I wish now to turn to a higher 
level: that of "learning" in general. I will mean by "learning" the 
development of categories, systems, schemes for relating perceptions 
and experiences to one another, and I will develop a model which is 
based, in its mechanics, on the processes that we have already seen: 
lateral and self inhibition. In essence, it is a model which 
describes the way in which we build the "screen" on which all of our 
perceptions are "shown,” Thus, it is a model of the way in which we 
see what we believe, rather than believing what we see, 
CHAPTER VII 
The ancient subject matter of psychology - the mind and 
its various manifestations - is distressingly invisible, and 
a science with invisible content is likely to become an 
invisible science. 
The model of learning which forms the basis of this chapter is 
little more than an extrapolation of the notions set forth in Chapter 
VI. I am concerned here with what the "screen" is on which all our 
-experiences and perceptions are based, and I am concerned with the ways 
in which the screen gets changed by our experiences. To put it as 
briefly as possible, I will argue that human beings, throughout the 
course of their lives, develop internal representations of their 
personal universes. They will, if you wish, build internal models, 
maps, pictures of what the world is like. These maps (the screens I 
have been talking about) then provide the framework within which all 
of their experiences occur, Learning as we traditionally view it 
(i,e, new concepts, theories, facts, etc.) is nothing more than the 
process of adding to, subtracting from, or changing one’s internal 
map of the universe, "Living in" as I have described it is the exper¬ 
ience that one has when his perceptions are not filtered, channeled, 
and explained by his internal map, 
—But let me use a simple example to become more clear about what 
an internal "map" is. When you first move to a new town, it is 
virtually impossible to navigate without some form of external aid. To 
get from your house to your office and back you will have to rely on a 
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city map, written directions, or possibly a memorized set of instruc¬ 
tions Saving you street names, landmarks , distances , and the proper 
bums in their proper places. After a while, of course, you no longer 
need to rely on anything external, You know where to turn, and all 
the landmarks that signal places to turn, slow down, avoid bumps, watch 
for traffic, etc,, are virtually automatic for you. In my terns, you 
have internalized a "map" of the route from home to work and back, I 
certainly do not claim that this "map" is anything like a road map. 
Rather, it is a very detailed representation of your perceptions as 
you drive from home to work. The more frequently you drive the same 
route, the more familiar it becomes - the more of its detail do you 
incorporate into your mental picture of the universe. Most import¬ 
antly, your internal representation of that route from home to work 
is your expectation of what you will perceive next time you drive. It 
is, if you will, the detailed screen on which your future perceptions 
are based. Usually, this creates no "problems" - the route is always 
the same as your internal picture says it should be. But, occasionally, 
the internal map’s predictions are wrong. One day you drive the route 
(or, better still, go back to visit an old, familiar place that you 
haven't seen for quite a while) and you ' feel that something is funny, 
but you can't quite put your finger on it, Your attention is riveted 
to some part of what there is to see, and you keep staring at it with¬ 
out quite knowing why. And then you realize it: that house used to 
be grey, not green; or that fence has just been painted; or a tree that 
used to be there was cut down,... After the route has become very 
familiar, we expect it to be the way our internal map says it is,- and 
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if it is different in the slightest detail, we pay attention to that 
slight difference. 
I begin, then, with the notion that people build internal models 
of the world - that these models dictate what people perceive while at 
the same time being changed by what people perceive - and that these 
models are a guide and framework for action. The problem of a really 
comprehensive psychology would be to "describe how actions are control¬ 
led by an organism’s internal representation of its universe" as 
Hiller, Galanter, and Pribram have begun to try to do.*' The problem 
of concern to me here is a more detailed analysis of those internal 
representations and how they get built. 
The most helpful evidence regarding the general nature of our 
internal maps and the general mechanism we have for changing them comes 
from the work of recent Russian psychologists (particularly Sokolov) on 
2 
the "orienting response". The orienting response itself is nothing 
3 
new to psychology, having been first pointed out by Pavlov and 
experimented with extensively since then. The orienting response is 
basically a "startle" response. It is a reaction to novelty, surprise, 
and involves turning toward the unexpected stimulus plus a whole range 
of physiological reactions (changes in heart rate, pupil dilation, skin 
conductance, etc.) which signal that an organism is paying attention 
(as in Chapter V - high level of arousal and much input being screened 
out) . 
The work of Sokolov in the late 1950’s provides the key to learn¬ 
ing as changes in the internal map. Sokolov placed dogs in a room, 
allowed them to get accustomed to it, and then introduced a new 
72 
stimulus (e,g, a tone). The dogs would, as expected, orient to the 
tone. Upon repeated presentation of the tone, the dogs would no longer 
orient to it - again, an expected and thoroughly documented process 
(known as "habituation"), Sokolov then found that if he changed the 
tone in any way, the dogs would orient to it again, until it was re¬ 
peated several times in its "new" form, when they would habituate 
again. If the tone were made louder or softer, higher or lower, the 
dogs would orient to it again, If the tone were made shorter in 
duration (e.g, 1/2 second instead of one second) the dogs would orient 
to the unanticipated silence. 
This final experiment, orienting toward unexpected silence, brings 
to mind a story which might well fix the "orienting response" in the 
reader's mind. Several years ago, the city of New York was forced to 
stop running its 63rd Street "L" (trains on suspended tracks) in order 
to do some work on the tracks. During the two weeks that the trains 
were not running, the police station received a large number of phone 
calls at 2 a.m. and 3 a.m. from the neighborhood in which the trains 
normally run. The callers would complain of burglars, but burglars 
were never to be found and nothing was ever missing. People would call 
in and claim to have been awakened in the middle of the night by unusual 
sounds. They could never describe the sounds, or even recall hearing 
them, but they had been awakened from a sound sleep by something. What 
was happening was that the 63rd Street L, which had become part of 
these people's internal map, part of their expectations of what happens 
every night at 2 a.m, and 3 a.m, , was not there, Their waking up in the 
middle of the night was an orienting response to the unexpected silence 
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caused by the absence of a train that was normally there, The "63rd 
Street L effect" was merely a powerful example of the orienting re¬ 
sponse. 
The two processes described above - orienting and habituation - 
represent the core of learning, When there is a discrepancy between a 
person’s internal representation of the world and the world as he per¬ 
ceives it, the person orients toward the source of that discrepancy - 
i,e. he pays attention to it. Having "registered" the anomaly for a 
sufficient period of time, he has succeeded in building it into his 
internal map, and hence he no longer pays attention to it - the "novel" 
is no longer "novel" - habituation (learning) has occured. 
The most lucid and economical model of what seems to be going on 
in the orienting response and habituation derives from the work of 
Hiller, Galanter, and Pribram in their general attempt to relate cog¬ 
nition and behavior. The model is based on a hierarchy of what they call 
"TOTE's": 
To oversimplify their conception a bit, what happens is that 
perceptual data enter the "mind" and are immediately tested against 
predictions from a person's cognitive map. If the entering information 
is consistent with those predictions, then no difficulties are en¬ 
countered and the organism proceeds on to its next activity or to the 
processing of the next bit of information from the world. But if- there 
is a discrepancy between the input and expectations, if the "Test" 
reveals an incongruity, then the organism perforins some "operations" 
to remove the incongruity. When the Test stage finally reveals the 
successful handling of the difficulty, the organism can move on to 
other matters. 
These TOTE’s are analogous to thermostats which test the temper¬ 
ature in a room and, if they find it different than their setting would 
"expect", perform some operation (turn a heater on or off) until the 
difference is rectified. The orienting response as a model for learning 
suggests that such thermostats exist in a hierarchical manner (i.e. with 
thermostats regulating other thermostats) from perceptual organs all 
through the cortex. The settings and changes in settings on the 
thermostats (the "test" phase of a TOTE) are learning as I have defined 
it - changes in a person’s internal representation of the world. 
The picture of learning which emerges from these considerations is 
one which fits nicely with both the ontology developed earlier and the 
theories of perception discussed in the last chapter. It is a picture 
of human beings developing their capacity for imposing structure and 
order on a chaotic world by building structured screening apparatus. 
Our perceptions are comparisons of the world as it comes in through our 
filters with a stored accumulation of categories and expectations. 
When the two fail to mesh, we begin to change our screening mechanisms 
slightly, so chat the new and unexpected becomes "familiar" ii. the 
sense that it "fits" a perceptual box which we have made for it, 
i 
The conception of a cognitive map as the "screen" on which our 
experiences are shown - as filter of our experiences and at the same 
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time subject to change due to experience - can be illuminated in some¬ 
what greater detail by refering once again to the work of Miller, 
Galanter and Pribram. In conjunction with their "TOTE" model, they 
posit the existence of two different kinds of structures within our 
cognitive maps, "Plans" and "Images". "A Plan is any hierarchical 
process in the organism that can control the order in which a sequence 
of operations is to be performed." "The Image is all the accumulated, 
organized knowledge that the organism has about itself and its world." 
Thus, the "operate" boxes in our TOTE’s are primarily built up of Plans, 
and the "test" boxes are. made of Images. The world, as it comes in 
through our screening processes, is constantly compared with Images - 
values, goals, facts, theories of the universe - which define our 
expectations of what the world ought to be. Our Plans summarize the 
ways in which we can deal with that input, be it consistent with our 
expectations or incongruous. 
Perhaps some examples of Plans, Images, and their inter¬ 
relationships would be useful. A football quarterback has, in his 
repertoire, a whole series of executable Plans that he can call on at 
will. The Plans range in complexity from such simple things as stand¬ 
ing, walking, and running to more complex sequences like a particular 
hand-off to a halfback or a series of fakes and a long pass. The Plans 
have been learned - i.e. built into the map as sequences that the 
quarterback can execute if he decides to - but the decision as to which 
Plan comes into play when is made with reference to Images. The Images, 
too, differ in their complexity. They range from simple "fact"-Images 
involving the quarterback’s knowledge of the shape and feel of a foot- 
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ball, his perception of the line-markers on the field, colors on his 
teammates’ jerseys, etc. to much more complex "valueimages. These 
latter, which range in complexity from the value of "winning this game" 
to that of "completing this pass play for a first down" or "leading 
the league in pass completions this year so I’ll be worth more next 
year", form the complex web around which decisions will be made. On 
the basis of the information coming in from the world and the in¬ 
congruities which that information creates in comparison with the 
quarterback’s entire set of Images, he will decide at each point in 
the game what plans to execute at what time. The process is, of course, 
an exceedingly complex one, with Plans and Images hierarchically organ¬ 
ized in terms of their importance and dependance on one another. Some 
of the Plans are consciously decided upon (e.g. a pass play now in¬ 
stead of a run) and some are automatically called upon to facilitate 
others (e.g, receiving the ball from center and fading back to pass). 
Similarly, some of the Images are consciously referred to (e.g. which 
is more important the first down now or the chance at a touchdown via 
a long pass?) and others are referred to automatically (e.g. the 
players on my team wear white jerseys). 
Complex though these considerations may be, it would appear that 
virtually all of human behavior can be accounted for in terms of such 
a scheme. Furthermore, there are some general principles regarding 
Plans and Images which ease the task of accounting for learning and 
behavior. First, Images change only when there is either a discrepancy 
between Images and the input from the world or between more than one 
Image, If one of the quarterback's teammates is wearing a black jersey, 
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or if the official rules of the game are changed, or if the field 
conditions are unusual, this input from the outside will modify the 
quarterback's Images. Or, if some of the quarterback's Images conflict 
with one another — e.g, the value of winning the game dictates one 
Plan but that of leading the league in pass completions dictates 
another - then the Images and their hierarchical arrangement will 
change to remove the conflict. 
Second, the execution of Plans is always subservient to some Image 
or set of Images, The quarterback's Images of what the world is like 
will always dictate the way in which his actions are called upon, and 
his value-images will always dictate which Plans are called upon at 
what times. Furthermore, Images dictate the ways in which new Plans 
will be learned. If the quarterback possesses a repertoire of skills 
which is more than sufficient to attain all of his Images - i.e, to 
meet all of his goals and live in a world free of incongruities - then 
he has no motivation to learn new Plans. But if some of his value- 
images are unattainable due to lack of sufficient Plans, or if some of 
his fact-images continually raise incongruities that he cannot handle, 
then he is motivated to learn new Plans (and/or change his Images) so 
as to live in a more predictable world, As was suggested by our dis¬ 
cussion of the orienting response, learning only occurs when something' 
goes wrong ** when the world is not as it was expected to be, or when 
plans are not successful in reaching the goals that we wish to reach. 
The general model of learning which I have been describing in this 
chapter relates closely to the work of several psychologists in a host 
of different areas. Needless to say, none of them accept the philoso- 
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phical position from which I begin, but all of them are working on 
models of learning which focus on the ways in which information coming 
from the outside is coded, changed, stored, and made part of some inter¬ 
nal representation of the world. The extensive developmental work of 
4 5 
Jean Piaget and, more recently, of Jerome Bruner is a good case in 
point. Though their philosophy is basically that of the realist, 
their psychological work is an attempt to discover the ways in which a 
child's view of the world changes over the years. They, as I, realize 
that the way in which the child actually experiences his world changes 
radically over the course of his life and that the key to learning is 
an investigation of the ways in which experience changes the child's 
mode of experiencing. Readers interested in some fascinating discus¬ 
sions of the ways in which children come to see the world as a 
collection of objects, to give but one example, would do well to 
consult the works of Piaget and Bruner. 
Similarly, the work of a great number of what are currently 
called "cognitive" psychologists bears directly on the model of learn¬ 
ing proposed here. From the initial ideas of Tolman to George Miller s 
work^ on information processing to the computer simulation work of 
Newell, Shaw and Simon8 - virtually all of the current cognitive 
psychologists are concerned with the ways in which a person s internal 
map of the world is built and with the ways in which that map affects 
the person's perception of the world and behavior in the world. I have 
no desire to catalogue here the developments of these men, for I wish 
to move on to a discussion of the relationship between the philosophy 
and psychology already discussed. 
79 
Before proceeding to head out of the trees and look, for the forest 
again, one other perspective must be considered - that of Arthur 
9 
Koestler in his brilliant THE ACT OF CREATION. Koestler mounts a 
convincing argument that creativity, whether in humor, the arts, or 
the sciences, always involves the bringing together of two perspectives 
(matrices as he calls them) within a single human mind that have not 
been combined before, To catalogue examples of this phenomenon would 
be merely to reproduce Koestier's book, but perhaps a couple instances 
would be useful, Consider the following joke (taken from Koestier's 
multitudinous, if sometimes strained, examples): 
A man and his bald boss, having just finished lunch, step 
outside the tavern on their way back to the office. A passing 
bird deposits its droppings on the bald man's shiny crown, 
leaving his subordinate in much dismay. 
"Heavens!" (or some such exclamation) he declares, "can 
I do something for you? Perhaps I should get some tissue 
paper?" 
"Hell no," replies the boss, "the bird must be a mile 
away by now," 
The humor (creativity) in the joke lies in the fact that, up until 
the punch line, we have been considering the tissue paper from one 
perspective (a means of cleaning the boss' head) whereas the pinch 
line forces a completely different (though not, in itself, unfamiliar) 
perspective on the use of the tissue paper. It is the simultaneity of 
the two perspectives, not typically brought together, which provides 
the essence of creativity. 
In science, this process is, if anything, even more apparent. The 
creativity of Fleming in his discovery of penicillin resided in his 
bringing a different perspective (the possibility of curing disease by 
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destroying bacteria) to a very familiar event (mold in a culture jar) 
which had always been seen from quite a different perspective (a huge 
annoyance to those trying to culture bacteria). The creativity of Newton 
can be found in his combination of two, until that time, widely separate 
perspectives - that of falling bodies on the earth and of orbiting 
bodies in the heavens. The examples could be expanded ad infinitum, 
and the reader is encouraged to return to Chapter Ill's scientific 
examples from the perspective of creativity as a process of combining 
previously disparate perspectives. 
In terms of both the psychology and the philosophy which I have 
been discussing, Koes tier's view of creativity makes eminent sense, 
Psychologically, the combining of separate perspectives is, in ny terms, 
a process of bringing together parts of a person's cognitive map that 
had previously been quite separate. It is the process of calling to 
mind, simultaneously, two or more Images which had not been considered 
together (and which may have been thought to be contradictory) and of 
producing a new Image which combines the two. It is the process of 
changing one's internal representation of the world by rearranging and 
combining the categories which we had previously thought to be satis¬ 
factory. Philosophically, Koestler's view of creativity has, perhaps, 
even more significance for me as one of many useful bridges between 
psychology, philosophy, and the educational process. It is to such 
considerations that I wish now to turn, 
CHAPTER VIII 
We have to deal with human reality as a being which is 
what it is not and which, is not what it is. 
Koestler’s model of creativity bears directly on the philosophical 
notions discussed much earlier. The creative flash arises from the 
conbination of two or more perspectives which had formerly been 
separated or even seen as mutually contradictory. If the world were 
as the realist would have us see it, there would be much to be wary of 
in a theory of creativity based on paradox, combining of contradictions, 
and the breaking of standard categories. But if the world is 
inherently contradictory, if the universe is an undifferentiated whole 
which necessarily displays paradoxes when it is described in language, 
then Koestler’s characterization of creativity makes eminent sense. 
The argument I am searching for is considerably more detailed 
than ought to go in the body of this document. It hinges on the 
difference between a world-view which accepts and expects paradox, and 
one which fights furiously to avoid the contradictory. We of the West, 
being well-indoctrinated Realists, find paradox a strange and uncomfort¬ 
able bed-fellow. If forced to delve into a self-contradictory statement 
like the Cretian saying "All Cretians are liars," or "All generaliza¬ 
tions are False", we search desperately for the flaw in the statement. 
Or, if we happen to be Bertrand Russell'*' and find such an irresolvable 
paradox at the foundation of an entire scheme of logic, as he did1, then we 
reconstitute the rules of logic to disallow the paradox. A world which 
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obeys the rules of realism simply has no room for paradox and 
contradiction. 
But the realization that we live in an undifferentiated world 
carries with it not only a tolerance for, but a certain amount of 
relish in, contradictions. The Japanese lives (or at least used to 
live) in such a world. For him, the two statements "This is a book" 
and "This is not a book", though contradictory, could both be seen as 
true at the same time. For him, the statement "All generalizations are 
false" could be both true and false at the same time without causing 
any discomfort by the fact that, in either case, the statement is a 
real, unavoidable paradox. 
Creativity, as Koestler has described it, requires the acceptance 
of such a paradox. It requires that the creator submit to the fact 
that his categorizations of the world contradict themselves, and yet 
must be accepted and brought together within a single framework. As 
such, the act of creation is, for me, a small example of the kind of 
mystical experiences and schizophrenic experiences that I have described 
earlier. It is one small instance of the realization that words 
do not describe the world as it is; that categorization is inevit¬ 
ably faulty in a world that exists uncategorized. We create, if you 
will, when we destroy our preconceptions of the order and separate¬ 
ness of what we see as differences in the universe. We create when we 
realize that two "points" on the world-hologram are not separate as we 
had formerly believed they were. If the simple act of creation is the 
pulling together of one pair of formerly separated perspectives, then 
the ultimate act of creation is the mystical experience - the realiza- 
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tion that all perspectives are the same, that paradox is inevitable 
and integral to the verbalization of an unverbalizable universe. 
Philosophically, then, Koestler's Act of Creation is a demonstra¬ 
tion of the kind of contradiction which is crucial to the "successful" 
use of words in a world which words cannot describe. Psychologically 
it is, as I have already mentioned, a description of one important 
way in which people come to change their cognitive maps - by 
simultaneously calling to mind two separated aspects of those maps. 
The relationship between philosophy and psychology thus seems to be very 
close on this point and, , since I claimed earlier (see Chapter IV) that 
an adequate psychology must explain itself as well as its philosophy, 
this would seem a good place to begin that attempt. 
Let me start with the obvious. The psychological arguments which 
I have been using do not, except for the fact that they rely on words, 
begin with a realist's view of the universe. Rather, they start with 
the assumption that whatever order we find in our lives is there be¬ 
cause we have created it and imposed it upon a genuinely chaotic world. 
But, at the same time, the evidence and theories which I have used make 
some progress toward explaining how it is that we do, in fact, impose 
order on the universe. The psychology thus begins with an assumption 
that it, later, tries to explain and confirm. And if that is paradoxi¬ 
cal, so much better for the philosophy! So far so good - at least we 
have the beginnings of a psychology which tries to explain its own 
assumptions. ( 
Now, the somewhat less obvious. Assuming that a cognitive map 
psychology can explain and defend the very assumptions on which it is 
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grounded, how does that psychology explain and defend itself? Here I 
sit, a human being who, by virtue of that fact, presumably operates in 
the ways I have been describing as true for all human beings. I am 
executing certain Plans, called on by certain Images all of which have 
been built in by a lifetime of experiences and all of which, by my own 
admission, are arbitrary ways for me to impose order on a chaotic world. 
Does my psychology and my philosophy explain me? Does it account for 
itself and for my insistance upon inner maps, Plans, Images and the 
rest? 
To be honest, I’m not even sure of the best way to approach such 
questions, A complete autobiography would, of course, be helpful, for 
then the reader could judge for himself the ways in which a cognitive 
map theory would help explain my insistance upon cognitive maps. But 
more revealing, or at least easier, is a close look at this document. 
As I cautioned in the Introduction, it must be seen as no more and no 
less than a reflection of my own biases and commitments. There is 
literature, in psychology and philosophy, which I have not included 
here because in its pure form it would contradict things that I believe. 
Equally to the point is the fact that the astute reader will, at this 
point, have a good idea of what literatures I am refering to and, at 
the same time, will realize that if I did refer to them I would inter¬ 
pret them in my own particular way, so as to make them fit the 
psychology and philosophy that I am espousing. 
It is this latter point which, more than anything else, seems to me 
to be crucial. All that I am writing here, and all that I am not 
writing, is a reflection of the screens, biases, and maps which I use in 
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interpreting my world. When I look at the world, when I talk about it, 
and when I use categories to describe it I am inclined, or perhaps 
forced, to do so in the very ways I have been describing. This document 
in a very real sense, an autobiography. When I investigate human 
beings I am inclined to look at the ways in which they screen perceptual 
input and organize their chaotic experiences into a world. Why? Be¬ 
cause that is the way I screen my inputs and organize my chaotic 
experiences, When I look at humor and Japan I see the Zen view of an 
undifferentiated universe, and at the same time realize that a different 
observer (e.g. the reader) might well see something completely differ¬ 
ent, When I investigate the General Theory of Relativity I see the way 
in which a strong commitment to a theory warps and interprets a meaning¬ 
less mass of data, realizing full well that other investigators of the 
same events must find confirmation of their different biases there. And 
when I delve into the life of a Supreme Court Justice I must focus on 
the ways in which that Justice’s biases have controlled his decisions, 
because my own biases control my own decisions and perceptions. Thus, 
if there is any evidence available as to how my psychology and philosophy 
help to explain themselves and my own development of them it is in the 
ways in which my own biases and perceptual screens have produced this 
document, 
One last point regarding this complex issue. Do I claim that my 
statements in this document are "true" and should be taken as describing 
a world existing outside of me? Quite obviously not, What I am describ¬ 
ing is the way in which I experience the world, the categories I 
use to describe it. Some readers may be persuaded to change parts, 
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small or large, of their cognitive maps by virtue of having read this. 
Most readers will probably accept what fits their existing maps and 
reject the rest. So be it, for we all have our blinders on and mine 
nonetheless in force for having been spelled out in detail here. 
The philosophy and psychology under discussion, then, seem to tie 
together fairly tightly. First, in that they represent basic aspects 
of one person’s Weltanschauung (mine). More abstractly, in that they 
mutually support each other's assumptions, And finally, a new point 
and the one which I suppose the reader has been anticipating for a 
while, in that they support the same conclusion regarding who knows 
what's best for individual learners. Implicitly, all of the 
philosophical and psychological arguments I have presented urge us to 
the realization that individual learners are the best judges of what 
they need to know at every point in their educational careers. But 
let me make those ties more explicit. 
What we call "education" is concerned almost exclusively with the 
development of cognitive maps as I have described them. We teach our 
students to slice the world up, categorize and systematize it, describe 
and "explain" it verbally, and react to it on the basis of those 
categories. But if the world is, "in fact", undifferentiated, then any 
system of categories will do as well as any other. There is no right _ 
or wrong in terms of slicing up a world which isn't "really" sliced up, 
In a world where categories are the products of man's minds and not of 
__things-in-themselves , the educator's curriculum is an arbitrary thing, 
possessing no Authority beyond that contained in the educator’s commit¬ 
ment to it. The teacher seeks to pass on his knowledge to his students, 
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but the key to his knowledge is his commltment to a vast system of 
arbitrary, ultimately indefensible categories, ideas, and theories. 
Viewed from the perspective of the "world-hologram”, the compulsory 
system of education which we so cherish is scarcely short of an imirense 
perversion, A group of educators who do not have, and never could have, 
any special comer on The Truth are able, through what amounts of brute 
power, to determine for students the ways in which they will see the 
world, divide it into categories and, thus, react to it. There is, and 
can be, nothing special about the particular way that educators 
categorize the world but, nevertheless, compulsory education will assure 
that all students are required to experience the world that way. We 
will consider some of the practical disadvantages of such a system in 
the next chapter, but without wishing to sound too much the moralist I 
would suggest that this monopoly of power, this excessive control of 
our students’ lives and perspectives, is at best indefensible and at 
worst catastrophic. There is no One Best Way to categorize the world, 
and we are constantly deceiving ourselves and our students by perpetuat¬ 
ing an educational system which assumes not only that there is such a 
Way but also that educators know it, at least in broad outline. 
It might, of course, be argued that the world-hologram notion, if 
taken seriously, does compel a certain kind of education for everyone 
an education quite different from that which we currently label as such, 
That is, we might argue that the task of education ought to be one of 
making sure that all students participate in acts of knowledge, living 
in, mystical experiences as often as possible, As a lofty aim for educ¬ 
ation, this program is eminently attractive to me. As I shall mention 
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briefly in the next chapter, I see it as one of the major problems of 
our times that students ao not have the opportunity to become committed 
to something, to lose them-selves , to be creative - to live in. But 
adding the contemporary notion of compulsion to that lofty ideal seems 
to me not only useless but positively harmful. For the crucial element 
of the act of knowledge is the personal involvement and commitment 
inherent in that act. And I_ cannot force you to feel that sense of 
commitment. Indeed, as the Zen literature so aptly demonstrates it is 
even impossible for me to force myself into a ’’self-loss" experience. 
The harder one tries, the more one is compelled either by himself or 
especially by others, the less likely it is to occur. In fact, the 
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existential literature would suggest that one key road to a living- 
in experience is the experience and feeling of complete freedom. In 
any case, coercion and acts of knowledge do not go well together. I 
would greatly hope that more of us could experience the universe in its 
undifferentiated wholeness, but the very best we could do as educators 
would be to provide likely possibilities for students and then give 
them maximum, freedom to explore and find a sense of commitment. More 
than anything else, it is the element of compulsion in our current 
system which stands between students and acts of knowledge, By pushing 
them in the directions that we want them to go, we mitigate against the 
possibility that they will become so enraptured by something of their 
own as to live in it and thereby gain knowledge. 
Psychologically, our system of compulsory education is equally in¬ 
defensible, In my terms, what we commonly label as education is the 
process of trying to change other people's cognitive maps so that they 
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contain categories, screens, ideas, or theories that we want them to 
contain. But remember that cognitive maps change only when they have 
to - i.e. when they meet with some discrepancy between what they pre¬ 
dict and what happens. This can occur in several ways, to be sure: 
(1) My fact-Images may not square with input from my senses; (2) Two 
or more of my fact- or value-images may conflict when brought to mind 
simultaneously (Koestler’s ACT OF CREATION); (3) I may be frustrated 
in attempts to achieve some value-images by lack of suitable Plans. 
Thus , we can. psychologically, describe different kinds of situations 
in which people will be motivated to learn - to change their internal 
representations of the world. 
But the educator of the modern world is far more audacious than 
that. By virtue of his prescription of a curriculum’s "scope and 
sequence" and his further prescription of the way in which material is 
presented, he presumes to know what each student needs to know at all 
points in his educational career. Therein lies the height of pre¬ 
sumption. Faced with a class of, say, thirty students whose life 
experiences (and thus cognitive maps) differ very considerably, how is 
the teacher to know who needs what, when, and in what form? How does 
the teacher look into each student’s cognitive map, see what discrep¬ 
ancies (actual or potential) are there to be resolved, and then provide 
a common experience which will fill in all of his students’ gaps satis¬ 
factorily? Seen in this light, the task of educating one student, much 
less a class of thirty, takes on a rather different perspective - one 
i 
which ought to strike fear into the heart of any teacher who feels he 
is slightly less than omniscient. 
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Psychologically, the question of who knows what a person needs to 
know boils down to the more basic question of who knows a person’s 
mind. Granted that my cognitive map is enormously complex and contains 
many screens, assumptions, and discrepancies that I am blissfully un¬ 
aware of, I would be hard-pressed to defend the notion that anyone else 
besides me can gain a greater knowledge of that internal map than I 
currently have. To put it much more simply, I do not know myself per¬ 
fectly by any matter of means, but 1 know myself better than anyone 
else does or can. The current structure of compulsory education 
assumes that such is not the case. It assumes, in fact, that educators 
can prescribe for all children what they need to know, when they 
ought to learn it, and how that learning can best occur. Unless 
educators are considerably more clairvoyant than I have been led to 
believe, that assumption is challenged by a fairly impressive body of 
cognitive and physiological psychology. 
Individual students, then, are always the best judges of what 
they need to learn at every point in their lives. First, because in 
an uncategorized world no-one has or can have a comer on Knowledge. 
Second, because individual human beings know their own minds better 
than anyone else does or can. Having traveled through eight chapters 
of philosophy and psychology, the reader is right back to where we 
started in the Introduction, To some extent I might rightfully be 
accused of playing cat and mouse. It would be difficult indeed for me 
to assure the reader that my conclusion regarding who knows what's 
( 
best for students is based on the preceding seven chapters of arguments 
For those seven chapters are equally based on this chapter's conclusion 
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It is, if you will, a chicken-and-the-egg problem as I warned the read¬ 
er in the Introduction, Quite frankly, it makes little difference to 
me which is conclusion and which is premise. The whole thing makes 
a fairly neat bundle and you are free to look at it from whichever 
end you please. 
At this point, however, I will let the point stand on however 
secure a theoretical base I have been able to build for it. In theory, 
at least, students know what they need to learn better than anyone else. 
In practice, what happens in schools that violate this principle? If 
we look at schools and classrooms that claim to know what students 
should leam, what can we say about the effects on students? And if 
those effects makes us uncomfortable about our entire educational 
system, where do we go from here? If compulsion destroys meaningful 
education, how do we educate without compulsion? Now that we have 
emerged from the trees and can see the forest, I wish to turn briefly 
to such pragmatic questions. 
I 
CHAPTER IX 
Those who can, do. Those who can't, teach. Those who 
can't teach, teach teachers. 
I do not think it would be an exaggeration to say that education 
in America is but a hair's breadth from disaster. Ours is a mystify— 
ingly complex society and it is not being served well by an educational 
system which changes far too slowly. In an age where men are circling 
- -the moon, we continue to have a high school curriculum that includes 
Latin. In an age when mankind has the capability for blowing himself 
off the planet ten times over, we have difficulty conceiving of 
education as anything but 30 students required to listen to one teacher 
for 50 minutes in a classroom a century old. At a time when human 
problems have become so large as to outweigh all else, when cities are 
about to explode and suburbs stare on in apathy, we continue to insist 
that courses in History of Education and English Methods will produce 
good teachers. And in a society becoming increasingly sensitive about 
issues of power, the schools still reign supreme over their students, 
despite growing protests. 
It is, of course, this last point which seems to me to be the crux 
of the matter. Unlike so many educators, I am not the least bit sure 
that I or anyone else could successfully describe what ought to be in 
the curriculum for all students or what kinds of teachers we ought to 
have in our schools. I have my pet subjects, and to me they seem 
virtually indispensable. And I have had some outstanding teachers who 
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would serve as my models if I ever undertook the task of describing 
the ideal teacher. But these are nothing more than my peculiar biases 
in curriculum and teaching, no more nor less defensible than those of 
any other educator, and all of them are far less defensible than a 
student’s biases, when it comes to educating that student. 
Education, after all - whether compulsory or not - is for students, 
and who can possibly know a student’s needs better than the student 
himself? But our present system of education simply does not recognize 
a student’s capacity for self-knowledge. At all levels, from kinder¬ 
garten through doctoral programs, and in virtually all of its aspects, 
from the teacher to the curriculum planner, American education wallows 
in the deception that it can prescribe what is best for its students. 
We formally require that students be in school at least eight years, and 
the economic structure of our society is more and more requiring 16 
years of school as job preparation. And having forced their physical 
presence in schools, we proceed to carefully order, according to our 
biases, the "learning environments" of our students. 
The school, not the student, decides what the student will study, 
for how long, in what circumstances, and in what sequence. The school 
even decides what time of each day the student should be thinking about 
what subjects. From nine to ten every morning, the student should be • 
a mathematician, but at ten he should become a linguist and at eleven an 
expert on state capitols. And woe unto the student who has a brilliant 
mathematical insight during "English time"! And, to make the bizarre 
I 
outrageous, the teacher even controls what the student should think and 
say within each of those hours. If the student doesn’t know the right 
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answer when he’s called on, it does him little good to have known it 
five minutes earlier or to learn it five minutes later. To talk in 
class about matters which the teacher finds irrelevant borders on the 
sinful, however relevant it might seem to a student. 
To some extent, I will admit to creating a strawman, a parody of 
our public school system. But I would hasten to add that, to a large 
extent, our schools are themselves a vicious parody of education. What 
amazes me most about them is the extent to which they control the lives 
of their students. And what frightens me most about many recent 
developments in "scientific" education is that the desire of educators 
is for more, not less, control. Dogmatism has always horrified and 
perplexed me, but to see it institutionalized in schools is more than 
I can bear. It is the conception which we have of the schools as 
authorities on what every child should learn and how he can best learn 
it that seems to me to be ruining the educations of most students. I 
have already devoted eight chapters to explaining why, in principle, I 
think that assumption is wrong, but on a practical level the assumption 
ends up being almost malicious. 
The dangers of school dogmatism are most apparent and saddening in 
its dealings with "below average" students, a point which an anecdote 
might best illustrate. One of the most enthusiastic, alive groups of ■ 
students I have ever taught was a group at the "bottom 20 per cent" at a 
somewhat "below average" high school. Of course, the students hated 
school, found it immensely boring, disliked most of their teachers and 
I 
all of the school rules, found the curriculum totally irrelevant to 
their interests, and in general disagreed with everything the school had 
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to say. But what amazed and frightened me was that they agreed with 
the school on one crucial point: it categorized them as stupid trouble¬ 
makers, and despite their hatred of school, they agreed. Furthermore, 
the school equated "being smart" with "being a good person", and so did 
my students. Twelve years of schooling had done almost nothing positive 
for these students by way of helping them to learn skills or relevant 
branches of knowledge, but it had been brutually successful in a 
negative way. It had so destroyed their images of themselves as to make 
them feel they were stupid, worthless, troublesome human beings. 
It seems to me very important to understand what is going on in 
a situation like this and exactly how it is that the school’s assumption 
of its own authority is so successfully devastating these students. For 
one thing, it is becoming increasingly obvious that much of America’s 
current difficulty in educating its black students hinges on exactly the 
same factors - the x^hite school's power to set and enforce standards of 
what is a good human being. And for another, the anecdotal works of 
1 2 
authors like John Holt and Paul Goodman suggest that the same attitude 
in the schools interferes with the learning of all of its students, how¬ 
ever "bright" they might be by conventional standards. 
What was happening to my students, and what is currently happening 
in schools throughout the country, is that the school defined for them 
what, when, and how they should learn, all the way through their 
educational careers. The definition of learning and ability to learn 
(and hence, in our society, quality of human-hood) was prescribed by 
the schools and literally forced on its students with no thought or 
credit given to the students’ different interests, styles, motivations, 
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or abilities. And if a student didn't learn in the narrowly delineated 
ways that the school set forth, then he was incapable of learning and 
somewhat subhuman. If I had to consciously devise a scheme for destroy¬ 
ing the self-images of students and preventing them from learning, I 
doubt that I could do better than what the schools already have done. 
The student who is simply not interested in the narrow range of things 
that the school has to offer, or whose cognitive map is different than 
his teachers' and hence attuned to different kinds of information, must 
leave such a system convinced of his own inferiority and inability to 
learn anything. 
What we have, in essence, is a school system which assumes that it 
knows what cognitive maps (world-views) its students ought to have and 
assumes that it knows the procedures which students must follow to 
build that cognitive map. The system is dreadfully wrong on both counts, 
and students who reject its instruction must sense this, but the 
students, too, accept these assumptions and interpret their own failures 
accordingly. And, worst of all, the schools are unable to see how wrong 
those two assumptions are and how damaging they can be to students. The 
schools do not and cannot prescribe for students what they ought to know 
- the "right" way to categorize the universe - for there is no such 
beast. The curriculum that we force students to accept (or to reject on 
peril of destroying themselves) does not represent The One True Way to 
look at the world, and what makes it dangerous is not the fact that it 
is wrong in the way it slices up the world, but that it presumes to be 
Right with a capital "r". No, it's even worse than that, for the schools 
have the power of compulsion to make students believe that they are 
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Right and any student who sees the world differently is Wrong. And the 
schools only compound error upon error by assuming that they know the 
best ways to assure that students get what is Right. For by prescribing 
the sequence of a curriculum, the Training of teachers, and the nature 
of the classroom situation for all students, the schools virtually 
assure that many students will fail. The cognitive maps of students in 
school are as diverse as we could possibly conceive, and however 
sophisticated the Educators’ Instructional Method might be, it will 
inevitably fail to mesh with the minds of many students if only because 
the educator cannot see into those minds and thus cannot know what 
pieces will fit into the puzzle in what order. 
John Holt’s HOW CHILDREN FAIL, Jonathan Kozol’s DEATH AT AN EARLY 
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AGE, and Herbert Kohl’s 36 CHILDREN seem to me the best popular 
descriptions of the ways in which school dogmatism can destroy students. 
Somehox^, due to the legal authority vested in the schools and their 
crucial link to the American economic ladder, failure at school comes to 
be quickly equated with failure as a human being. And this entire 
atmosphere of fear of failure permeates our school systems at all levels 
- from failing to graduate, to failing to be in the top 10 per cent of 
the graduating class, to failing a particular course, to failing to 
answer a particular question correctly. Instead of being an educational 
environment the school grotesquely transforms itself into a proving 
grounds for self-hood. If you meet the pre-set criteria of educators, a 
very narrow set indeed, you are a good person and if you don t you re 
not. Those criteria are, of course, arbitrary, narrow, haphazard and 
totally inappropriate for a lot of students, but nevertheless they are 
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the standards against which we judge our students and, ultimately, our 
students judge themselves. It’s the last half of the preceding sentence 
that is most troublesome, for it is something which we have systemati¬ 
cally failed to notice. But whether we pay attention to the fact or 
not, the schools do, by virtue of their compulsory nature and their 
attitude of supreme rectitude, mould the judgements of their students 
about themselves. And since the system has such a narrow tolerance for 
what constitutes good performance in school, a frighteningly large 
number of students leave the system with truly miserable opinions of 
their self worth. 
But the effects of compulsion on "good" students, though less 
frequently noticed and less socially controversial than what I have been 
describing, seem to me to be equally severe and depressing. The 
students who "make it" in our current system have done so because they 
succeed at playing our game in what we consider to be an exemplary 
manner. If they feel good about themselves (and they do so to a greater 
extent than that "bottom 20 per cent") it is because they, too, have 
accepted the schools’ criteria of what is a good person and what is not. 
And deeply embedded within those criteria is the implicit (and sometimes 
explicit) notion that a good person is one who does what his superiors 
(i.e. teachers) tell him; one who accepts their standards, their values, 
their interpretations, and their styles of living. Whatever else a 
good student in current American schools might be, he is definitely not 
a person who respects and follows his inner light. 
99 
When I talk about "good" students, I am, of course, primarily 
referring to tnose in suourban settings where a major criterion of 
"good" is going on to college. And many of the problems which I see 
the schools helping to foster in such students through their compulsory 
nature have been vividly described in Kenneth Keniston’s THE UNCOMMITTED. 
His description of the suburban student (and his parents) matches those 
of such authors as Paul Goodman^ and Edgar Friedenberg^ and paints a 
fairly uncomplimentary picture of the effects of compulsion upon "good" 
students. Forced into a school and community situation which is 
severely limited in its diversity, such students emerge with a severe 
lack of sensitivity to basic differences in world view, with a fairly 
deep-seated conviction that the middle class school’s values are right 
for all human beings, with a complete lack of awareness of the rich 
diversity in ethnic, religious, and economic climates that exist in 
America, and with a large dose of "uncommittedness" and apathy. 
These "good" students have gone through a school system which has 
told them, authoritatively and with the backing of their parents, how 
to look at the world, what to know, what is good and what is bad, and 
what standards to use in evaluating themselves and others. Above all, 
they have learned that it is good to do what you are told, especially if 
the teller is a teacher who, presumably, knows what's best for you. 
Such students certainly do not trust their own judgement, their own 
ability to make decisions for themselves, or their own values and 
feelings. In fact, it is sometimes doubtful that they even have values, 
feelings, and judgement of their own. In any case, what values they 
have and operate by are not the result of close personal inspection and 
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existential commitment. They have been committed to a set of values 
and a world view by others without ever having made the difficult, 
emotional, personal commitment to those values which would give them 
fn some very real sense they are machines, acting out the 
commands of others, with no sense of personal involvement, risk, 
enthusiasm - in a word, with no sense of being alive. 
To claim that all of this is a result of the compulsory nature of 
schools would be an over-simplification which is too extreme for even 
me to make, The parental environment, the entire suburban culture 
and, indeed, the gargantuan social forces that are operating in 
Twentieth Century America are all implicated in the "good" (as well as 
the "bad") student's plight. But to deny the role of the compulsory 
school in fostering a lack of self-direction is equally disastrous, for 
the role is there and is, perhaps, more subject to change than some of 
the other factors which seem to be involved. Again, let me illustrate 
briefly from my classroom experience. 
I was teaching a class of high school seniors in an upper middle 
class school (near a prestige University) and the students were 
definitely college material, all of them. The first revelation was a 
fairly obvious one: by asking them why they wanted to go to college I 
quickly found that they had never even considered the possibility of not 
going. They had no idea of any possible alternatives to going to col¬ 
lege, and had "just always assumed" it was good for them to go to college 
right after high school, The title of the course was "American ^ 
History" and that frequently set the stage for other revelations, When 
our class discussions drifted away from history into psychology or 
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philosophy, the students always became more responsive, alive, and 
involved. But at the same time they felt guilty for not learning 
history. They enjoyed learning psychology, They enjoyed learning 
philosophy. And they even enjoyed learning history in an unconvention¬ 
al manner (e.g. theories of history or the personal lives of famous 
people). But they would frequently complain about "not learning what 
we’re supposed to be learning" even though that (stale, textbook history) 
was boring and repugnant to them. Finally, though these students were 
given the opportunity to explore any area that they wished in any way 
they wished without penalty (they had the ultimate voice on their grades 
in the course) most of them had extreme difficulty in deciding on some¬ 
thing to explore and few of them, over the course of a semester, ever 
got deeply involved in something that interested them. This is in con¬ 
trast to another class (the bottom 20 per cent of a very "average" high 
school) whose students responded creatively and enthusiastically to the 
same challenge. 
"What we can glean from this," to paraphrase a Judy Henske song, 
"is that the students had the wrong attitude about a lot of things." 
They simply did not trust their own interests, their own values, their 
ability to make choices for themselves, Although they disliked standard 
history, they felt a strong compulsion to sit through it anyway since 
that’s what their mentors expected of them. They had swallowed, with¬ 
out question, the values of their suburban teachers and had great 
difficulty in conceiving of (much less adopting) any other set of values 
And when their personal opinions, values, ideas, or goals did not fit 
the standard pattern, they trusted to the pattern, not to themselves. 
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They would rather be bored learning what the teacher wanted them to 
learn than to be excited and involved in something that they wanted to 
learn. To put it another way, they had great confidence in their 
ability to play the teacher's academic game successfully, but no 
confidence whatsoever in their ability to invent their own rules, To 
merely ask them what they believed firmly in, what they held so dear 
that they’d give their lives for it, what they could get so involved in 
as to disregard the rest of the world, was to ask them a totally mean¬ 
ingless question. They believed in obedience to their teachers and 
could hardly conceive of such a thing as personal commitment. 
The extent to which such qualities in students can be traced to 
the compulsory nature of education is, of course, difficult to deter¬ 
mine. There are other social forces (particularly in the middle class 
suburb) which tend to work in the same direction. But, be that as 
it may, it is still the case that compulsion in the schools does leave 
little room for a student to set his own standards, adopt his own world 
"view, and live with his own set of commitments. When an educational 
critic like John Holt, for example, berates the schools for inducing a 
f,fear of failure" he is , I think; speaking very much to the same point. 
It is not, I submit, that Mr. Holt wants us to prevent standards from 
ever seeing themselves as failing by_ their own standards, for that is a 
natural, and perhaps even healthy, human process. The danger lies in 
the fact that the compulsory school automatically sets the standards of 
failure* for the students, If he fails to meet those standards, he sees 
i 
himself as a failure. It is the fact that students are literally 
coerced into accepting the schools' rather limited and very arbitrary 
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standards as the basis of their opinions of themselves that stands in 
the way of any real education or any real personal growth. 
The compulsory nature of education, then, stands in the way of 
many of the most important things we would all like to see happen to 
students. It necessarily fails, by its narrowness of standards, to 
capitalize on the rich diversity of perspectives which it otherwise 
might foster. It dangerously interferes with the student’s ability to 
set his own value standards, define his personal worth to himself, and 
feel that he is in control of his own destiny. It fosters the kind of 
student who is little above an automaton - accustomed to obeying orders, 
unable to guide his own life, and completely unfamiliar with the feel¬ 
ing of control and commitment that is at the essence of being fully 
alive. And it even fails to supply its students with the skills and 
category systems that the system sees as crucial to all students. For 
even in the teaching of skills like reading, the element of compulsion 
in our educational system tends to prevent students from learning as 
quickly and pleasantly as they otherwise might. When it is always the 
teacher who decides when and how Johnny should learn to read, it is no 
surprise that many Johnnies never learn to read. The teacher, after 
all, cannot see into Johnny’s mind and that is precisely what the 
teacher would have to be able to do in order to really be in a position 
to tell Johnny when and how to learn to read. 
Compulsion and the concomitant lack of diversity and alternatives 
for students, seem to me to be severely implicated in many of the 
i 
failures of modern education. Let me conclude, then, by briefly 
describing the kinds of learning situations that would both be more in 
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accord with the philosophy and psychology proposed here and would, at 
the same time, help to remove those failures by removing compulsion 
from the educational setting. 
CHAPTER X 
Education and the Smell of Joy 
What happens when a child learns under his own direction? What 
happens when no one is telling him what to learn, when to learn, or how 
to learn, but he is free to pursue things as they interest him? What 
happens when adults are free to share their judgements with students, 
but do not have an ax (grade) to use if the students reject those 
judgements? In short, what happens when students are given total free¬ 
dom and responsibility for their own learning? 
Let us consider some anecdotal examples of learning which seems to 
come closer to the conditions of freedom suggested in the above 
questions than does the typical American school. A very young infant, 
for example, learns a great deal about his world despite (or because 
of?) the fact that no-one has prescribed a curriculum for him, told 
him when to learn what, or designed a method for his learning. He 
learns to control his own body, to control general aspects of his 
environment (indeed, he learns that there is an "I" and an "environment1 
which can be separated from each other), that there are such things as 
objects which are relatively permanent and do not disappear when not 
observed.,,. He learns to crawl, to walk, to understand words, and to 
talk. We could go on and on with the enormous list of basic concepts 
and skills that young infants and children learn without ever being 
coerced into learning - indeed, with no one having the slightest idea 
of how to teach them such things if they wanted to. 
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Or consider the, again, pre-school child’s intense fascination 
with the world around him; his ability to look at a single flower for 
hours or to repeat a simple act over and over and over again; his at 
times incessant and, for his parents, unbearable asking of that nasty 
little question, "Why?1 ; his general ability and desire to do things, 
learn things, build a meaningful world for himself. Now I am not just 
trying to make an old point about "the natural curiosity of children." 
It is true that children are by nature curious in the sense that they 
begin with a world almost completely lacking in structure and have much 
need to make sense of it - i,e. to build their own cognitive maps. 
But I am more interested in the kind of learning that goes on in such 
situations as I have mentioned. They are situations which differ from 
school experience primarily in the fact that there is no formal struc¬ 
ture, no one has set their educational goals and means for them, they 
are free to explore their world and build it on their own. Is the 
quality of their learning different from that in the schools? 
I would claim that it is, substantially so. The self-directed 
learning of young children is characterized by precisely that sense of 
commitment and total involvement which is usually lacking in the schools. 
Learning, for an infant who is not told that he must learn something, 
is a joyful experience. A young child can be literally enraptured by a 
new skill (e.g. closing his fist, sticking out his tongue) that he xs 
learning, or a new phenomenon (a flower, a rock, etc.) that he is trying 
to build into his view of the world, There is joy in learning for young 
children, and so they revel in it, It is no surprise to me that our 
earliest years are our most crucial ones. We learn far more in Qur 
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earliest years than we will ever learn in the rest of our lives, and 
the learning we were engaged in then was characterized by the smell of 
joy. It is as we got older, as we learned that we ought to learn what 
certain other people thought we should learn, as we lost the freedom to 
pursue the things that genuinely interested us at the moment, that 
learning became unpleasant and that we began learning less and less. 
We are creatures of joy, seeking pleasure, and compulsion drives the 
joy out of learning. 
We can, of course, find other examples of the smell of joy in free 
learning involving students much older than the pre-school child. They 
are more rare since our educational system does not foster them, but 
they exist. There are students who become absorbed in particular topics 
of their own choosing, usually to the teacher's dismay but occasionally 
with his approval. Virtually every school has those few students who 
are real experts on something-or-other through their own initiative. 
And many students at all levels thrive to some extent by using the 
compulsory school as an intellectual supermarket - taking what they need 
or want and sleeping through the rest, The point is net that learning 
stops when the schools take over, but that the schools do virtually 
nothing to foster self-directed, committed, joyful learning. To do so 
is to admit that students know what's best for themselves educationally, 
and the schools are far from admitting that. 
The best example that I know of to illustrate the potential power 
of self-directed learning comes from an as-yet unpublished experiment 
performed by Robert Hager. The experiment involved adults, but I con¬ 
sider that to be irrelevant for it is the comparison between teacher- 
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directed and student-directed learning that I wish to center on. Hager 
was hired to write a programmed instruction manual which could replace 
a 10-day course which was being used to train women to read electrical 
meter dials. Mager wrote the text, and was enormously pleased to find 
that women who worked with it for merely eight hours could read the 
dials as well as those who graduated from the 10-day training program. 
Had the experiment stopped there it would have been interesting, but 
irrelevant to this discussion, 
But Hager then created a third condition for learning to read the 
dials. He told a group of women about all of the resources which were 
available to them that might help them learn to read the dials - 
people whom they could question, dials they could practice on, the pro¬ 
grammed texts, other books, etc. Then he turned them loose and told 
them to go about learning however they wished. The women went off in 
all different directions, some to play with the dials, some to read, 
some to ask questions. In an average time of TWENTY MINUTES this group 
was more proficient at reading the dials than either of the two pre¬ 
ceding groups. When given a wide range of alternatives and allowed to 
structure their learning as they, individually, wished their learning 
was substantially more efficient than when they were required to follow 
someone else’s prescription. 
There are other "experiments" which appear to teach the same 
lesson. The Leicestershire County Schools and Summerliill in England, 
several private schools in America (e.g. The Sudbury Valley School, 
Pacifica High School in California, some Summerhi11-modeled schools), 
and several public schools in American which are providing substantial 
109 
amounts of 'unstructured time" for their students seem to be pointing 
the way toward giving students responsibility for their own learning. 
Much theory and some practice suggest that we need to devise ways to 
allow students to have control of their own educations, so let us 
briefly consider some possible changes in American education that 
might move in that direction. The variety of changes in education that 
would help students to control their own educational careers is as 
diverse as the ways in which compulsion currently exists in the system. 
The coercion is explicit in our compulsory attendance laws which re¬ 
quire students to be in school, usually through the age of 16 or 18. 
It is more implicit, but nonetheless real in the growing economic 
necessity of going to college and, thus, the college's control through 
its admissions criteria of the lower school's curriculum. But compul¬ 
sion is present at much more discreet levels within each school. It 
takes the form of dress codes, closed campuses and closed classrooms, 
narrow curricula which offer no choice to students, rigid classrooms 
which offer no choice within given courses, and perhaps most clearly and 
disastrously in the form of teacher-assigned grades. 
This entire problem of assigning grades to students for their work 
in particular courses is such an old one and has been discussed so 
lengthily that I wish only to mention it in passing. Whatever else can 
be said, it must still be admitted that grades are a problem, and the 
current trend toward basing grades on performance criteria or behavioral 
objectives will not get to what I believe to be the heart of the matter. 
Whether they are grades assigned at the teacher's whim or elaborately 
defined behavioral objectives, we are still left with a situation where 
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the student is evaluated by a teacher, in the light of a teacher's 
standards, and succeeds only when he performs the way the teacher wants 
hrm to, However loose, unstructured, and student-centered a classroom 
might be, the fatal element of compulsion is always lurking around the 
corner if the teacher assigns grades to his students. With the power 
to grade, the teacher can always let the ax fall when the students 
aren t doing what he wants them to do. If there can be real freedom in 
a teacher-graded classroom, it must always be tinged with a substantial 
amount of fear and distrust of the grade-giver. The students are free 
in what they do only so long as the teacher doesn't drop the ax, It is 
like being free to scamper in a meadow in full knowledge that an expert 
marksman is standing over you with full power and ability to cut the 
scamper short whenever he so desires. 
Any proposal which attempts to remove any of the above-described 
elements of compulsion in American education would be an important step 
toward making education more sensible, at least in light of the consid¬ 
erations in this document. For a start, let us consider the largest, 
most impractical, and probably most effective possible step. If we 
were really committed to giving students the final responsibility for 
their own learning, we might begin by abolishing all compulsory, public 
education and leaving the entire educational system on a free enterprise 
basis, The idea here is for students to have a real choice in all 
matters relating to their education in the way which has most authority 
in modern America - through money. As I envision it, a free enterprise 
system of education would enable students to pick and choose among a 
great variety of educational opportunities. The system would operate by 
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a sort of Intellectual Law of Supply and Demand. Students would create 
the demand by having money to spend on educational experiences, and 
the demand would be met by a wide variety of individuals, groups, and 
corporations who wished to make their fortunes by supplying what the 
students demanded and could pay for. 
As I see it, an educational system which literally allowed students 
to buy whatever kinds of education they could find on the market would 
literally shower students with possibilities. Individual teachers 
would "hang cut their shingles", groups would form educational clinics, 
corporations would invest in large educational centers, all sorts of 
people would develop and advertise educational experiences which they 
felt would tap the needs of students. Those teachers and/or experiences 
which did, in fact, meet a felt need of students would survive and even 
flourish. Those which failed to meet the needs of students or which 
students merely found too distasteful or irrelevant to pay for, would 
die a quick financial death. The key elements to the success of such 
.a. venture would be first that it would provide a rich diversity of 
possibilities for students and second that students would individually 
have control over the experiences which they encountered and collective¬ 
ly would have control over the variety which was available to them. 
Insofar as the market remained open, insofar as monopolies were pre¬ 
vented and competition for student resources existed, insofar as educa¬ 
tional possibilities were well advertised to students, and insofar as 
students (rather than their parents or, indirectly, college admissions 
criteria or college board exams or some other institutional criteria) 
had real control over the spending of their educational funds, a free 
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enterprise educational system would successfully eliminate compulsion 
from education and provide a rich atmosphere wherein students could 
learn joyfully the things they found to be most relevant. 
There are complications and difficulties with such a proposal 
ranging from parental control of student's choices to the ethics of 
the large corporation. Were this a different book, I might spend more 
time in dealing with such problems but I wish here only to suggest a 
diversity of proposals which might help to implement the philosophical 
and psycholcgical considerations I have already dealt with. Further¬ 
more, the free enterprise notion of education is not a new one, and 
the interested reader is encouraged to look at similar proposals made 
by Milton Friedman and by Jencks and Reismann. Furthermore, I have 
dealt with some of the practical issues involved in free enterprise 
education in a bit more depth in my "The Free Enterprise Teacher", 
School and Society, April 1969. 
There are several other levels at which compulsion can be removed 
-from education so as to make it more relevant and more joyful by 
allowing it to be more personal. We could, for example, retain public 
educational institutions but fill each school, from kindergarten 
through college, with a rich diversity of alternative courses and 
experiences, letting the student pick whichever of the offerings he 
deemed to be relevant to him, in any sequence and for any length of 
time. Instead of having lock-step, scope-and-sequence curricula, the 
public schools and their teachers could serve as resource centers to 
students. Supplying alternatives which students freely selected, and 
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which survived and died out on the basis of student demand and 
interest. 
One way to make such a publicly student-directed system work 
would be to replace the current notion of a transcript and grades with 
a student portfolio. Throughout his educational career, a student 
could compile a portfolio which included his descriptions of his 
educational experiences, the comments of others on those experiences, 
an accumulation of the student's work (e.g. papers, films, drawings, 
machines the student has built, etc.), and a series of comments and 
reflections by teachers on the student's perceived strengths and 
weaknesses. The portfolio, and an abstract of it, could serve as the 
basis for any decisions which some educational institutions (e.g. 
colleges) might want to make regarding admissions, and could also 
serve as a basis for the decisions of future employers. Prather than 
accumulating a record of courses taken and grades earned, the student 
would assemble a portfolio which described his experiences as 
evaluated by himself and others and would thereby be free to engage in 
whatever educational activities he wished, rather than being forced 
through a prescribed curriculum over which he has no control. But 
compulsion can be removed at even more discrete levels than that of 
individual institutions and school-wide portfolio systems. Individual 
teachers can operate their individual classrooms in such a way as to 
leave the student free to make his own educational decisions. It is, 
in fact, a fairly simple procedural matter. If the teacher merely 
assigns to his students the responsibility for evaluating themselves, 
for giving themselves the final grade in his course, then the individual 
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classroom can be opened up so as to allow students a great measure of 
educational freedom. When students evaluate their own progress, they 
are free to accept or reject the judgements and offerings of the teach¬ 
er as they see fit. If the teacher’s activities in the classroom are 
not meeting his needs, the student is free to go elsewhere and pursue 
whatever he wishes, without having to fear the teacher’s power to drop 
the ax. When the student grades himself, he^ has the ax, and with it 
the power, freedom, and responsibility to guide his own learning. In 
such a situation, the role of the teacher quickly shifts from one of 
authoritative dispenser of information and wisdom to one of resource- 
provider and possibly even a helpful human being. 
For the teacher, the act of giving over his ax to his students, 
though initially sometimes a threatening process, can be an immensely 
rewarding and freeing experience. Both students and teacher can benefit 
from the increased openness and honesty which an ax-less teacher can 
display. Without the power to enforce his judgements arbitrarily on 
his students, the teacher is free to share his judgements and personal 
biases as a human being interested in his students, but not in control 
of their lives. When students grade themselves, teachers are free to 
be human beings instead of presuming to be authorities, and students 
are free to rely on their own judgement even if it conflicts with the 
teacher’s . 
We would continue to catalogue specific proposals for change of 
this nature in education almost endlessly — teacher education programs 
could encourage and help teachers to conduct student-directed class- 
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rooms; administration programs could encourage the adoption of the 
portfolio, no-requirement approach; institutions of higher education 
could give serious reconsideration to their narrow entrance criteria 
and the effects they have on lower schools, etc. But to put the whole 
thing very bluntly, all such changes will ultimately rest on a sub¬ 
stantial change in the attitudes of Americans in general and educators 
in particular. As long as we continue to believe that students need 
our direction and authority in order to become "good" people; as long 
as we believe that we know what is best for students; as long as we 
distrust the judgement of our students, we will continue to assure that 
we have the power of compulsion over their lives. 
But if we did believe in our students then we would be quick to 
entrust them with the freedom and responsibility to govern their own 
educations. We would realize that it is unnecessary, and even harmful, 
for us to require all students to learn to read at an early age, to 
give but one example. We would realize that if we took the responsi¬ 
bility to provide several different avenues for learning to read, and 
made sure that they were open to students without penalty at any age, 
then students would learn to read if and when they decided it was 
appropriate - the best possible time. Some might learn at age four, 
others might not feel the need until age 25 , and others might live 
happy, productive lives without ever learning to read. To insist that 
all people must learn to read at age six because we know it is crucial 
to their lives and because we1 re afraid they will fail to realize the 
lack of confidence in the judge' importance is to blatantly display our 
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ment and self-directing powers of students. It is also, as I have 
tried to show, to fly in the face of a substantial body of philosophy 
and psychology which makes our assumption of omniscience highly 
questionable. 
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